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Abstract
This dissertation contains three essays in macroeconomics and financial economics that
aim to understand the empirical importance of information and intermediaries on aggregate
fluctuations, and consequently, the role of macroeconomic policy.
Chapter 1 provides direct evidence of the importance of firm attention to macroeconomic
dynamics. This chapter develops a text-based measure of firm attention to macroeconomic
news and documents firm attention that is polarized and countercyclical. Differences in
attention lead to asymmetric responses to monetary policy: expansionary monetary shocks
raise stock returns of attentive firms more than those of inattentive firms, and contrac-
tionary shocks lower returns of attentive firms by less. In a quantitative model of rationally
inattentive firms with parameters for information frictions calibrated using the text-based
measure, firms invest in attention endogenously and face heterogeneous information costs.
Less attentive firms adjust prices slowly in response to monetary innovations, which yields
non-neutrality. As average attention varies over the business cycle, so does the efficacy of
monetary policy.
Chapter 2 provides empirical evidence of the causal effects of changes in financial inter-
mediaries’ net worth in the aggregate economy. The empirical strategy developed in this
chapter identifies financial shocks as the high-frequency changes in the market value of in-
termediaries’ net worth in a narrow window around their earnings announcements, based
on tick-by-tick data. News of declines in U.S. intermediaries’ net worth leads to significant
declines in the market value of nonfinancial firms. These effects are more pronounced for
small firms and when the aggregate net worth of financial intermediaries is low. In addition,
xi
this chapter discusses channels through which intermediaries affect nonfinancial firms, which
provides evidence of the effect of intermediaries on corporate borrowing costs.
Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence that economic narratives influence consumer sen-
timent. It develops a framework that captures news narratives of economic events using
natural language processing and traces consumers’ exposure to different narratives using
retweeting activities. The framework is applied to study the narratives surrounding the
yield curve inversion. Exposure to the negative narrative of an imminent recession causes
consumers to display a more pessimistic sentiment, while exposure to the positive narrative
that recession concerns are overblown leads to no change in consumer sentiment.
xii
Chapter 1
Firm Inattention and the Transmission of Monetary
Policy: A Text-Based Approach
Wenting Song and Samuel Stern
1.1 Introduction
Public information often goes unused because attention is scarce. Rational inattention mod-
els pioneered by Sims (2003) and a broader set of incomplete-information models (Mankiw
and Reis, 2002; Woodford, 2009)1 consider firm managers who gather information to max-
imize value while facing cognitive costs of processing information. Inattention provides an
intuitive microfoundation for monetary policy non-neutrality in which firm managers mis-
interpret nominal monetary policy as shocks to real demand, yet empirically assessing the
importance of attention is challenging because neither a firm’s allocation of attention nor
information-processing costs are readily observable.
This paper provides the first direct evidence of the importance of firm attention to
macroeconomic dynamics using a novel text-based measure of firm attention. We document
countercyclical firm attention and uncover substantial heterogeneity in attention across firms.
Moreover, our measure is consistent with the asymmetric prediction of inattention models
1Additional work includes Lucas (1972); Angeletos and La’O (2013); Gabaix (2019); Farhi and Werning
(2019).
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that attentive firms exhibit higher profit semi-elasticities in response to expansionary mon-
etary shocks and lower semi-elasticities following contractionary shocks. We then use this
measure to calibrate information costs in a quantitative general equilibrium model with ra-
tionally inattentive firms and show that firm inattention generates monetary non-neutrality.
Together with our empirical evidence on countercyclical firm attention, this result suggests
that aggregate attention to macroeconomic conditions is an important dimension of state-
dependence in monetary policy.
To construct our attention measure, we compile a corpus based on approximately 200,000
annual SEC filings of US publicly-traded firms and search each document for macroeconomic
keywords. We define two measures of attention: “prevalence”, whether firm managers discuss
macro conditions at all, and “intensity”, the frequency at which managers discuss macro
conditions.
We document two stylized facts about firm attention. First, firm attention is polarized.
The majority of firms in our sample either mention macroeconomic conditions in every filing
or in none of their filings. Second, attention is countercyclical. Among the remaining firms
with time-varying attention, the number of firms that mentioned macroeconomic news rose
notably during recessions.
Our main empirical result validates that our text-based methodology effectively measures
attention by testing for an asymmetry in firm performance that is predicted by inattention
models: following a macroeconomic shock, firms with greater information-processing capacity
should respond closer to the optimal response regardless of the shock’s direction. Therefore,
more attentive firms should exhibit higher profit elasticities in response to positive shocks
and lower elasticities in response to negative shocks as they update prices more accurately
than inattentive competitors. We test for this asymmetry using an event-study design that
exploits high-frequency variation in firms’ market values around FOMC announcements.
This test requires combining our prevalence attention measure with daily CRSP stock prices,
quarterly Compustat firm financials, and high-frequency monetary shocks constructed as in
2
Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a).
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, expansionary monetary shocks raise stock
returns of attentive firms by 2% more than those of their inattentive peers, whereas con-
tractionary shocks lower returns of attentive firms by 6% less. The suboptimal responses to
monetary shocks by inattentive firms are direct evidence of the cost of inattentive behavior.
Moreover, the asymmetry invalidates some concerns about measuring firm attention with
text analysis. Concern that filings contain macroeconomic buzzwords as a form of cheap
talk to appease investors would imply a zero effect; concern that firms mention keywords
solely as a function of exposure to monetary policy would imply symmetric responses to
monetary shocks; and concern that stock returns vary with investor attention rather than
firm attention would also fail to explain the asymmetric responses.
We then use our attention measure in a quantitative rational inattention model to study
the aggregate implications of the heterogeneity in firm attention. Firms with heterogeneous
information costs optimally trade off between the precision of their signals on aggregate de-
mand and the cost of acquiring and processing information. Information-processing costs
and the distribution of firm attention are calibrated using our text-based attention mea-
sure. Consistent with our empirical findings, attentive firms in the calibrated model have
higher semi-elasticities to expansionary monetary shocks and lower semi-elasticities to con-
tractionary shocks. We incorporate the empirical countercyclicality of firm attention to show
that the efficacy of monetary policy declines as the fraction of attentive firms increases and
more firms set prices closer to the optimum. This new interpretation of attention-dependent
monetary policy implies that central banks should expect the effects of policy to be weaker
when an aggregate shock has already drawn firm attention to macroeconomic policy.
Related Literature Our paper contributes to four strands of literature. First, we con-
tribute to the empirical literature on macroeconomic expectations by developing an ongoing,
broad-based measure of firm attention that extends back to the mid-1990s. Recent literature
3
has highlighted the importance of expectations for macroeconomic policy2 and consequently
the need for empirical measures3. To study expectations in a macroeconomic context re-
quires measurement beyond lab evidence (Reutskaja et al., 2011) or individual consumers
(McCaulay, 2020). Our methodology complements survey-based evidence on firm expecta-
tions by Tanaka et al. (2019), Coibion et al. (2018), Afrouzi (2020), and Candia et al. (2021)
and enables researchers to explore questions that lie outside the coverage of existing surveys.
Second, our findings on firm inattention lend empirical support to a broad body of theo-
retical work on incomplete information as a source of monetary non-neutrality (Sims, 2003;
Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Woodford, 2009). Microfoundations proposed in rational inatten-
tion and sticky information models are successful in explaining firm pricing (Mackowiak and
Wiederholt, 2009; Afrouzi and Yang, 2021), asset prices (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp,
2009), discrete choices (Matějka and McKay, 2015; Caplin et al., 2019), and reconciling mi-
cro and macro evidence (Auclert et al., 2020). However, the lack of measurement on firm
attention makes it challenging to assess the empirical relevance of these microfoundations.
Our results estimate a substantial cost of information frictions in the US data, providing
direct support for these theories.
Our findings on the relationship between countercyclical attention and monetary policy
efficacy relates to existing literature on state dependencies of monetary policy. Tenreyro
and Thwaites (2016) estimate non-linear responses in monetary policy which are weaker in
recessions than in expansions. Vavra (2014), McKay and Wieland (2019) and Ottonello
and Winberry (2020) consider volatility, durable consumption, and default risk as other
channels through which state dependency arises. This paper suggests that attention may be
an important source of state dependency of monetary policy.
Finally, our paper relates to a broader and emerging literature that brings natural lan-
guage processing techniques to economics. The seminal work of Loughran and McDonald
2See, for example, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015); Coibion et al. (2020); Malmendier and Nagel
(2016)
3See Gabaix (2019) for a comprehensive survey of existing measure of attention.
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(2011) applies the “bag of words” method to firm filings and develops word lists specific to
economic and financial texts. Recent work has used textual analysis to measure financial
constraints (Buehlmaier and Whited, 2018), central bank communication (Hansen et al.,
2018), firm-level political risk (Hassan et al., 2016), and uncertainty (Handley and Li, 2020).
We contribute to the literature by constructing a dictionary of macroeconomic keywords
with detailed categories based on releases of macroeconomic series.
Road map The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in Section 1.2 we describe our
methodology for measuring attention and present evidence of the stylized facts listed above;
in Section 1.3 we present a theoretical framework that incorporates attention and exposure
to macro shocks and derive the predicted asymmetry; in Section 1.4 we outline an empirical
strategy for testing the effects of attention on expected returns and present our results; in
Section 1.5 we construct a quantitative model of rational inattention and conduct policy
counterfactuals; Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Textual measure of attention
This section presents our measure of firm attention to macroeconomic news for the universe
of US publicly-traded firms between 1994 and 2019. We then document several stylized facts
about firm attention before conducting the main empirical analysis in Section 1.4.
1.2.1 SEC filings
To measure firm attention, we employ the universe of annual 10-K filings with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between 1994 and 2019. Under Regulation S-
K, all public companies are required to disclose financial statements and business conditions
in these filings. The annual filings (Form 10-K) requires a more extensive discussion of
business conditions and audited financial statements, while the quarterly filings (Form 10-
Q) is usually less descriptive and only requires unaudited financial statements. Our sample
5
contains 201,751 unique annual 10-K filings by 35,655 firms. Table 1.1 shows the summary
statistics on the 10-K filings. The average length of 10-Ks is 30,647 words with 2,433 unique
words.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics on 10-K filings
N Mean Median SD Min Max
Total word count 201,751 30,647 26,133 23,031 152 199,520
excl. stopwords 201,751 18,912 16,128 14,232 98 164,734
Unique word count 201,751 2,433 2,496 1,039 74 7,937
excl. stopwords 201,751 2,337 2,395 1,026 68 7,822
Discussion of economic conditions in an SEC filing typically appears in two contexts:
recent or future firm performance and the risk factors that shareholders face by investing
in the company. The former context usually appears in Item 7 of 10-K and 10-Q filings,
which requires managers to discuss and analyze the firm’s financial conditions and results
of operations. This section is written as a narrative and can vary in length across firms (for
instance, Item 7 of Alphabet’s 2020 10-K filing is 17 pages long). Economic conditions in
the context of risk factors commonly appears in Items 1A and 7A, which detail general firm
risks and near-term market risks, respectively.
1.2.2 Methodology
Textual measure of firm attention To construct our main measures of firm attention
to macroeconomic news, we employ dictionary-based frequency counts in natural language
processing. We identify instances in which firms discuss the following nine macroeconomic
topics: general economic conditions, output, labor market, consumption, investment, mon-
etary policy, housing, and oil. Each topic is matched with a keyword dictionary that con-
sists of names of major macroeconomic releases from Econoday (the data provider behind
Bloomberg’s economic calendar) as well as words and phrases that commonly appear in
popular articles on each topic. Any words or phrases that might apply to both aggregate-
6
and firm-specific conditions are removed to avoid misidentification. For example, the phrase
“interest rates” is excluded from the monetary policy dictionary because firms may mention
interest rates in the context of their own liabilities. The dictionary of topics and associated
keywords appears in Table A.1.
We then construct two measures of attention based on these keywords. Attention preva-
lence, dkit, indicates whether a firm i mentioned any keyword related to a given topic k in
period t:
dkit = 1(Total topic-k wordsit > 0) (prevalence)
Attention intensity, skit, records the rate at which keywords are mentioned as a share of
total words in the filing. We interpret this measure as the average intensity with which firms
pay attention to economic conditions:
skit =
Total topic k wordsit
Total wordsit
(intensity)
Total word count is generated by following the parsing strategy in Loughran and Mc-
Donald (2011). First, a text is stripped of all numbers and “stop words” such as articles.
The text is then mapped onto a dictionary of words constructed by extending 2of12inf, a
commonly-used collection of English words, to include additional words in 10-K documents.
Sense check of the textual measure As a preliminary sense check of the textual mea-
sure, Table A.2 in the Appendix reports the summary statistics of firm characteristics by
attention. Attentive firms, whose prevalence attention to the general topic is nonzero in
any year in the sample period, tend to be larger, older, and slightly less levered than their
inattentive counterparts.
We then investigate the cross-industry variation in attention. Figure 1.1 reports the
share of firms that pays attention to each topic by industry. Industry is measured using
2-digit NAICS from Compustat. The quality of our attention measure varies by topic so
7
Figure 1.1: Firm attention by industry
Notes: Heat map of the fraction of firms in an industry that pay attention to each macroeconomic topic.
Industry is defined as 2-digit NAICS. Darker color represents a higher fraction of firms that pay attention.
these results should be interpreted across industry rather than across topic.
For each macro topic, attention is highest in industries for which profits are most sensitive
to the topic a priori. For example, Mining, Oil, and Gas (NAICS 21) has the highest share
of firms that pay attention to news about oil prices; Retail trade (NAICS 44-45) pays the
greatest attention to news about consumption; and finance (NAICS 52) pays the greatest
attention to news about FOMC meetings.
Furthermore, some industries appear to pay greater overall attention than others. Finance
ranks among the most attentive industries to employment, FOMC, output, and interest rates,
while agriculture (NAICS 11) and Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services (NAICS
54) appear least attentive overall.
The two features of cross-industry variation described above are fairly unsurprising and
serve as sense checks of our attention measure. Put simply, industries whose profitability
depends more on a certain macro topic have a higher share of firms that pay attention to
that topic, and some industries appear to have greater overall interest in aggregate economic
conditions.
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Figure 1.2: Time series of attention to “economic conditions”




























































Notes: Time series of firm attention to the keyword “economic conditions”. Left panel plots the prevalence
measure and reports the share of firms that mention the keyword. The right panel plots the intensity measure
and reports the average mentions of the keyword per 1,000 words. “Raw” refers to the unfiltered series and
“HP filtered” refers to the cyclical components of the HP-filtered series. Shares are reported in percent.
1.2.3 Stylized facts about firm attention
We now apply our prevalence and intensity measures to document two stylized facts about
time and firm variation in attention: firm attention in the US is countercyclical and polarized.
Countercyclical attention to economic conditions Both the share of firms that men-
tion macro keywords and the intensity with which firms mention macro keywords vary coun-
tercyclically over the business cycle. To illustrate this, we plot the time series related to
the keyword “economic conditions”. Figure 1.2 plots the share of firms that mention the
keyword. The left panel reports the prevalence measure, and the right panel reports the
intensity measure. Both panels also show the cyclical components of the HP-filtered series.
The share of firms that mention “economic conditions” increased over the sample period,
with faster growth during recessions. The share of firms jumped by about 15 percentage
points during the Great Recession and has moderated to approximately 80% in subsequent
years.
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Figure 1.3: Share of filings that mention “economic conditions”
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Notes: Histograms of the share of filings by a firm that mention “economic conditions”. The left panel shows
the histogram of the average fraction of filings that mention the keyword “economic conditions” over the
sample period of 1994-2019. Dark blue bars correspond to the distribution of all firms, and light blue bars
correspond to firms appearing for at least 5 years in the sample. The right panel shows the histogram of the
time series averages of the residuals of firm attention to “economic conditions” after regressing on industry
fixed effects. Shares of firms on the vertical axes are reported in percent.
The intensity related to the keyword “economic conditions” across all filings displays
a stronger cyclical trend than the share of firms mentioning output. The share of words
increases more during recessions and falls faster during recoveries compared to the share of
firms mentioning output.
Countercyclical attention exhibited in Figure 1.2 is consistent with predictions by Mack-
owiak and Wiederholt (2009), who model firms that allocate attention between aggregate
and idiosyncratic conditions. Their model predicts that firms will pay more attention to
aggregate conditions in downturns if those conditions become more uncertain. This result
is also consistent with Chiang (2021), who develops a generalized information structure in
which agents pay greater attention to uncertain aggregate conditions when expecting a bad
economic state, which subsequently generates countercyclical attention and uncertainty.
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Polarization in firm attention Heterogeneous attention to publicly available news about
U.S. output provides the clearest evidence that firms are limited in their capacity to process
available information. The profitability of all publicly traded firms in our sample is arguably
exposed to variation in U.S. economic conditions, and we should expect firms with unlimited
information-processing bandwidth to incorporate this news into their decision making. Evi-
dence of heterogeneity is to the contrary and provides new insights into how firms allocate
attention differently.
The left panel of Figure 1.3 plots the histogram of firms by average attention over the
sample period. The number of bins matches the number of annual observations in our
sample and can be doubly interpreted as the number or fraction of filings in which firms
pay attention. A firm with a value of 0 for the fraction of filings on the horizontal axis has
never mentioned “economic conditions” over the sample period, whereas a firm with a value
of 1 has mentioned that phrase in every filing. Most notably, firms are concentrated at each
extreme: either never mentioning a macroeconomic keyword in their filings or mentioning a
macroeconomic keyword in every filing. Despite the countercyclical variation found above,
it appears that most variation in attention occurs across firms and that attention is largely
invariant over time.
To test whether this polarization is driven by firms with few filings, we replicate the
histogram using a restricted sample of firms with at least five years of filings. Although this
restriction greatly reduces the number of firms that never pay attention to macroeconomic
news in our sample, the polarization between always- and never-attentive firms remains.
We also test whether polarized attention is attributable to industry patterns in attention.
The right panel of Figure 1.3 demeans firm attention by industry to isolate within-industry
heterogeneity. This panel depicts a large degree of variation in attention even after accounting
for industry averages. Aside from a high concentration of attention at the industry average,
demeaned attention also appears bimodally dispersed.
The concentration at the industry average raises concern about the text-based measure:
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Does the frequency of macroeconomic keywords in 10-K filings capture firm attention to
macroeconomic news or firm exposure to aggregate conditions? It is entirely plausible that
a firm does not discuss the macroeconomy because its profits are insensitive to aggregate
fluctuations. Our main empirical analysis in Section 1.4 will focus on disentangling our
hypothesized attention channel from this alternative exposure channel. We test our hypoth-
esis by separately estimating the response of stock prices to positive and negative macro
shocks. If firms discuss macro news more often because they are more exposed to aggre-
gate fluctuations then “attentive” firms would profit more from a positive shock and lose
more from a negative shock, generating symmetric relative responses to macro shocks. On
the other hand, if the text-based measures indeed capture attention, then attentive firms
would outperform inattentive competitors regardless of the direction of the shock, resulting
in asymmetric relative responses. The theoretical framework in Section 1.3 discusses the
mechanism in detail.
1.3 Illustrative framework
Motivated by the evidence that firms are heterogeneous in their attention to macroeconomic
news, we set out to study how firm attention affects the transmission of macroeconomic
policy. Before doing so, we address a key identification challenge: whether our text-based
attention measures identify differences in firm attention to macroeconomic conditions, con-
ditional on firm characteristics, rather than differences in exposure to those conditions. To
confront the identification challenge, we lay out a stylized model in which firms are hetero-
geneous in both attention and exposure. For the two sources of heterogeneity, the model
yields contrasting predictions for stock return responses to monetary shocks, which we then
exploit to guide our regression specifications. The model environment is minimal to high-
light the key mechanisms for attention and exposure. In Section 1.5, we expand the model
environment to incorporate more realistic assumptions.
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Environment Time is static. Consider a firm whose profits, π(s, a), depend on an ag-
gregate state variable, s, and a firm action, a. Assume that π(s, a) is twice continuously
differentiable, a single-peaked function of a, and maximized at a∗ = s. For concreteness, we
think of a as the price that a monopolistically competitive firm sets and s as the exogenous
optimal price determined by factors outside of that firm’s control, as in Woodford (2009).
Firm profits can be approximated under a second-order log approximation around the
non-stochastic steady state as4:












where s̄ and ā denote the steady-state values, π̂, ŝ and â denote the log deviations from the
steady state, and πs ≡ ∂∂sπ(s, a), πaa ≡ ∂
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∂a2




Lastly, assume that firm profits are increasing in s, πs > 0, and that the second-order
condition for a stable equilibrium holds, πaa < 0.
Attention and Exposure We can now define attention and exposure in the model. A firm
is more exposed to aggregate conditions if its profits are more sensitive to aggregate shocks,
while a firm is more attentive if its action are more sensitive more to shocks. Definitions 1
and 2 formalize these ideas.
Definition 1 (attention). Let a firm’s action be a function of the state: â = f(ŝ), with
f(0) = 0 and 0 < f ′(ŝ) ≤ 1. Firm i is attentive to macroeconomic conditions if f ′i(ŝ) = 1,
and firm j is inattentive to macroeconomic conditions if 0 < f ′j(ŝ) < 1.
An attentive firm reacts one-for-one with innovations to the aggregate state, whereas
an inattentive firm responds less than one-for-one. The simplified definition of inattention
4Under this approximation, πa(s, a) drops out because of the first-order condition and assumption that
a∗ = s at the optimum. Appendix A.5.1 contains detailed derivations of the approximation.
13
is consistent with that in rational inattention models such as Sims (2003) which yields a
steady-state Kalman gain between 0 and 1.
Definition 2 (exposure). Firm i is more exposed to macroeconomic conditions than firm j
if πis(s, a) > π
j
s(s, a).
Differences in attention and exposure We now derive model predictions for hetero-
geneity in attention and exposure that guide the empirical analysis to come.
We first construct stock returns, which is the dependent variable in our empirical analysis.
As in Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016), a firm’s stock price is equal to its firm value, which
in the simple static setting equals its profits:
v = π(s, a)
Realized equity returns, measuring the log change in a firm’s value around an aggregate shock,
are given by:
r = v̂ − v̂−1 (1.2)
where v̂ ≡ log V − log V̄ denotes the log deviation of firm value from the steady state, and
v̂−1 ≡ logE−1 V − log V̄ denotes the log deviation of firm value before the shock is realized.
Proposition 1 highlights the asymmetric responses of stock returns to positive and neg-
ative aggregate shocks that result from the attention channel and the symmetric responses
from the exposure channel.
Proposition 1. The return elasticity with respect to aggregate shocks for the exposure and
the attention channels can be characterized as below:
1. Exposure: If firm i is more exposed to macroeconomic conditions than firm j, then
holding all else equal the return elasticity of firm i with respect to the aggregate shock
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2. Attention: Suppose firm i is attentive to macroeconomic conditions and firm j is
inattentive. Then, holding all else equal, the return elasticity of a positive (expansion-
ary) shock is higher for the attentive firm i than that of the inattentive firm j. For
negative (contractionary) shocks, the return elasticity for the attentive firm i is lower




















if ŝ < 0
Proof. See Appendix A.5.2
Figure 1.4 illustrates the predictions from Proposition 1. In Panel (a), firms are hetero-
geneous in their exposures to aggregate shocks, and those with high exposure exhibit higher
return elasticities to aggregate shocks regardless of the sign of the shock.Panel (b) illustrates
the mechanism of attention. Attentive firms are better at tracking the state variable, so
their stock returns outperform those of inattentive firms after any aggregate disturbance. In
response to a positive shock, stock returns of both attentive and inattentive firms rise, but
returns of attentive firms rise more. In response to a negative shock, returns of both types
of firms decrease, but returns of attentive firms drop by less.
This asymmetry in return elasticities is a unique feature of the attention channel and
allows us to distinguish between the effects of firm attention and exposure to macro news.
In the next section, we use this predicted asymmetry to show that our text-based measure
15









(a) Heterogeneity in exposure (b) Heterogeneity in attention
Notes: Illustration of model predictions of return elasticity with respect to aggregate shocks. Verticle axes
represent conditional realized return, and horizontal axes represent the magnitude of shocks. Left panel shows
return elasticity for firms that are highly exposed to macro conditions (high) and firms that are unexposed
(low). Right panel shows return elasticity for attentive firms (attn) and inattentive firms (inattn). Exposure
and attention are as defined in the main text.
correctly identifies firm attention and then estimate the cost of inattention based on the
difference in return elasticities for positive and negative shocks.
1.4 Empirical analysis
Given our attention measures and theoretical predictions, we set out to test the hypothesis
that attentive firms respond to macro shocks better than inattentive firms. We use a high-
frequency identification strategy that isolates plausibly exogenous shocks to monetary policy
from FOMC announcements and compares changes in stock prices of attentive and inatten-
tive firms within a similarly narrow window around these announcements. We implement our
empirical analysis with monetary policy shocks since they are familiar and well-identified5,
though the mechanism highlighted in our stylized inattention model is general to any aggre-
gate shock.
Stock prices are a particularly informative outcome variable because they are forward-
5Ramey (2016) provides a comprehensive survey on the efforts on identifying monetary shocks.
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looking and quickly reflect changes in expected future profits. By focusing on the high-
frequency windows of stock price movements, we are able to separate effects of monetary
surprises from other confounding factors. More direct measures of firm responses such as in-
vestment and hiring decisions are only observed over longer time horizons and are confounded
by other factors that influence firms’ choices.
To best isolate the effects of attention, our baseline specification controls for firm size, age,
leverage, and industry measured by 4-digit NAICS. The underlying identifying assumption
is that firms have similar exposure to monetary policy shocks within a narrowly defined
industry after conditioning on firm characteristics and financial structure. Residual variation
in stock prices can then be attributed to firm attention rather than cross-firm variation in
the exposure to monetary policy.
1.4.1 Data
Monetary policy shocks are constructed using the high-frequency identification strategy de-
veloped by Cook and Hahn (1989) and citetgurkaynak2005actions, and used recently in
Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016), Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a), and Ottonello and
Winberry (2020). These shocks are measured as the change in the fed funds futures rate
within a one-hour window surrounding FOMC announcements. Any changes within such
a narrow window can be attributed to unanticipated changes to monetary policy as it is
unlikely that other shocks occurred within the same window.
Monthly fed funds futures contracts clear at the average daily effective fed funds rate
over the delivery month, so rate changes are weighted by the number of days in the month
that are affected by the monetary policy shock. Following notation in Gorodnichenko and
Weber (2016), the final shock series is defined as,
vt =
D
D − τ (ff
0
t+∆t+ − ff 0t−∆t−), (1.3)
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where t is the time of the FOMC announcement, ff 0t+∆t+ and ff
0
t−∆t− are the fed funds
futures rates 30 minutes before and after the announcement, D is the number of days in
the month of the announcement, and τ is the date of the announcement. We use the series
published by Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) for
monetary shocks from 1994 to 2014.
Firm outcome and control variables are constructed using CRSP and Compustat data.
Daily stock returns are measured as the open-to-close change in stock prices on the day of
an FOMC announcement, matching the precise timing of the FOMC announcements which
fall between 1pm to 3pm. Firm size, age, and industry controls are constructed as described
in Section 1.2.3.
Firm attention is measured using the prevalence measure, dit, described in Section 1.2.
To better suit a high-frequency methodology, firm attention at the time of an FOMC an-
nouncement is identified using the firm’s most recent annual filing rather than the filing in
the same year as the FOMC announcement. This modification excludes the possibility that
firms are identified as attentive to an FOMC announcement using a subsequent filing.
1.4.2 Methodology
We separately estimate the slope of the interaction between monetary shocks and firm at-
tention for positive and negative shocks, and then test whether these two coefficients are
statistically different.
For a firm i in industry j on day t, our baseline model takes the form,
rit = δj + δjvt + βddit + β11vt>0 + βv+vt1vt>0 + βv−vt1vt<0
+ βdv+(dit · vt · 1vt>0) + βdv−(dit · vt · 1vt<0) + Γ′(Xt +Xtvt) + εit,
(1.4)
where dit is the attention prevalence, vt is the monetary policy shock, 1v>0 indicates positive
monetary policy shocks, 1v<0 indicates negative monetary policy shocks, and Xt is a set of
controls including the indicator variable for positive shocks and quarterly firm controls for
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size, age, and leverage. We also control for the interaction of monetary shocks with industry
fixed effects, δjvt, and with firm controls, Xtvt, to capture the effects of firm characteris-
tics on differential responses to monetary shocks. Standard errors are clustered by FOMC
announcement to allow for correlated errors across firms at each FOMC announcement.
The coefficients of interest are βdv+ and βdv−. The theoretical framework in Section 1.3
hypothesizes βdv+ to be positive and βdv− to be negative, implying attentive firms should
outperform inattentive firms in response to both expansionary and contractionary monetary
shocks. To formally test the hypothesis, we conduct a Wald Test with the null hypothesis
H0 : βdv+ = βdv−.
1.4.3 Empirical results
Our baseline results are reported in Table 1.2. In the first column, we estimate the effect
of high-frequency monetary shocks without our attention measures and find that a 25 basis
point unanticipated increase in the fed funds rate is associated with about a one percent
increase in stock prices. This result is consistent with existing estimates from Gorodnichenko
and Weber (2016) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a). The second column introduces
the unconditional interaction between monetary shocks and firm attention. We find that
attentive firms experience slightly higher stock returns than their inattentive counterparts
but our estimate is not statistically distinguishable from zero. This result is consistent with
the framework outlined in Section 1.3, which remains agnostic as to the average interaction
over the entire range of monetary shocks.
The main results from Equation (1.4) are presented in the third column. We test whether
attention leads to differential responses to positive and negative monetary shocks. Consistent
with predictions from rational inattention models, attentive firms appear to experience larger
increases in stock returns following expansionary monetary shocks and smaller decreases in
stock returns following contractionary monetary shocks. The coefficients are statistically
different from zero, and the Wald Test of whether these coefficients are equivalent is rejected
19
Table 1.2: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Exposure Attention excl. ZLB
Shock 4.55∗ 4.55∗
(2.53) (2.65)
Attention -0.01 -0.07 -0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Shock × Attn 1.07
(0.64)
Shock ×1vt>0 4.93∗ 6.54∗∗
(2.74) (2.75)
Shock ×1vt<0 -3.57 -0.95
(3.72) (3.69)
Shock × Attn ×1vt>0 2.02∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗
(0.72) (0.72)
Shock × Attn ×1vt<0 -5.87∗ -5.77∗
(3.18) (3.30)
Observations 575667 575667 575667 432458
R2 0.022 0.022 0.026 0.027
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes
4-digit NAICS FE yes yes yes yes
excl. ZLB no no no yes
Wald Test p-value 0.026 0.050
Notes: Results from variants of estimating the baseline specification (1.4):
rit = δj + δjvt + βddit + β11vt>0 + βv+vt1vt>0 + βv−vt1vt<0
+ βdv+(dit · vt · 1vt>0) + βdv−(dit · vt · 1vt<0) + Γ′(Xt +Xtvt) + εit,
where vt is the monetary shock, dit is the prevalence attention measure, δj and δjvt are an industry fixed
effect and its interaction with the shock, and Xt contains firm-level controls of size, age and leverage, and
Xtvt contains the interactions between firm controls and the shock. We have normalized the sign of the
monetary shock νt so that a positive shock is expansionary (corresponding to a decrease in interest rates).
Standard errors are clustered at the shock level and reported in parentheses. * (p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05),
*** (p < 0.01).
at 5% significance.
Finally, the fourth column ends the sample in 2007 to exclude the zero lower bound period
following the Great Recession. This excludes periods of forward guidance and unconventional
monetary policy and allows us to focus on conventional monetary transmission. Results are
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both qualitatively and quantitatively similar as in the full sample, suggesting our findings
are not driven by anomalies from the financial crisis, the zero lower bound periods, or the
information effects of monetary policy.
The asymmetric responses to positive and negative shocks are consistent with heteroge-
neous responses predicted by a model of inattention and rules out alternative interpretations
of the textual measure that predict symmetric responses. The first alternative interpreta-
tion, discussed in detail in Section 1.3, is that the textual measure misidentifies firms’ profit
exposure to macroeconomic conditions as attention. In this case, symmetric responses to
positive and negative monetary shocks would yield a positive and significant effect from the
interaction term between shock and attention (βdv) in the second column, which is incon-
sistent with our empirical findings. A second alternative hypothesis is that firms attribute
poor performance to broader economic forces and are more likely to mention FOMC meetings
when underperforming. We would then expect attentive firms to underperform in response
to negative monetary shocks, corresponding to a positive coefficient for βdv− in the third
column, which is also at odds with our empirical findings. Another concern is that investor
attention is more important to stock price than firm attention. Inattentive investors would
then systematically under-react to both positive and negative shocks, which fails to explain
the observed asymmetry. A final concern is that firms may differ in price stickiness even
within a narrow sector beyond controlled characteristics. For price stickiness to explain our
empirical results, it must be correlated with macro keyword counts in SEC filings, which
seems unlikely.
For additional robustness, the next subsection shows that our results are robust to con-
trolling for firm management quality, past exposure to monetary policy, information effects
of monetary policy, and macro variables.
The suboptimal responses to monetary policy by inattentive firms reported in Table 1.2
together with the large fraction of inattentive firms documented in Figure 1.3 provide some
of the first direct evidence on the empirical consequences of firm inattention in the US. We
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estimate that inattentive firm returns rise by 2% less following positive shocks and drop
by 6% more following negative shocks compared to those of their attentive peers. These
differences are substantial given the average stock return response of 5%.
1.4.4 Additional empirical results
The Appendix contains three sets of additional empirical results.
Drivers of firm attention The first set of additional results in Appendix A.2 investigates
firm characteristics that may drive attention to macroeconomic news. We now treat our
prevalence attention measure as the dependent variable and test its association with firm
size, age, leverage, management quality, and exposure to monetary policy announcements.
For each set of results, we separately estimate cross- and within-firm effects by including
sector and time fixed effects for the former and firm fixed effects for the latter.
In the cross-section, higher attention is associated with younger firms, consistent with
Cloyne et al. (2018)’s findings of stronger monetary responses by young firms, yet appears
to increase over time within-firm. Attention is also higher among larger firms and is weakly
associated with lower leverage, which is consistent with Ottonello and Winberry (2020)’s
findings of stronger monetary responses from low-leverage firms. Firm attention is associated
with higher management quality when measured as the share of board members who hold a
graduate degree, and with greater exposure to monetary policy when measured as a rolling
five-year average stock price response to high frequency monetary shocks.
Robustness checks Appendix A.3 checks whether our baseline results in Section 1.4 are
sensitive to additional drivers of firm attention or potentially confounding effects to high
frequency monetary shocks. We first control for the aforementioned drivers of firm attention.
Our baseline specification already includes controls for industry and firm covariates (age, size
and leverage). Tables A.6 and A.7 additionally control for management quality and exposure
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to monetary shocks, respectively, and show that our baseline asymmetric semi-elasticities are
robust in each case.
Two concerns that have been raised about high frequency monetary shocks are that i) an
“information effect” confounds the direct effects of a change to interest rates (Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2018a), and ii) monetary shocks may be correlated business cycle fluctuations.
Following Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2021), we control for each FOMC announcement’s
information effect using Greenbook forecast revisions between FOMC announcements and
show that our main results are little changed in Table A.8. We then incorporate macro
controls in Table A.9 including lagged unemployment, real output growth, and inflation.
Again, our main results are robust to these controls.
Limitations and promise of textual measures Recycled or boilerplate language is a
key concern of using regulatory filings to measure firm attention. 10-K filings are often writ-
ten collaboratively between managers and legal departments, and evidence suggests that
firms include certain statements within 10-K filings to appease investors or lower liability
(?). Moreover, firms likely save time and resources by revising their filing from the prior year
rather than starting from scratch. Boilerplate language is a concerning source of measure-
ment error when it includes keywords that identify firm attention. In Appendix A.4.3, we
test whether boilerplate language contaminates our main results by measuring the diversity
in filing language with a Jaccard score of lexical similarity and restricting our analysis to
the most linguistically diverse 10-K sections. Results in Table A.10 are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar as the baseline results.
Even greater measurement error may come from misidentifying attentive firms as inat-
tentive (Type II error), which raises concerns about underestimating overall firm attention.
False negatives may occur if our text analysis fails to identify discussion of economic topics
due to limited sophistication, or if attention is not uniformly publicized in 10-K filings across
firms. For the purposes of this paper, underestimated attention would attenuate our results
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and imply that our current estimate for the cost of information frictions serves as a lower
bound.
Text analysis methods also hold tremendous promise for uncovering a more refined depic-
tion of firm attention and expectations formation. We illustrate these capabilities with two
approaches for identifying the context in which firms discuss economic conditions. The first
approach (Appendix A.4.2) uses a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) unsupervised model
to categorize words that neighbor a given keyword. The second approach (Appendix A.4.1)
uses the itemized structure of 10-K filings to identify which sections of the filing contained
the most keywords.
1.5 Quantitative model
Motivated by the empirical heterogeneity in firm attention, we now construct a general-
equilibrium model with rationally-inattentive firms to understand the aggregate implications
of heterogeneous firm attention. Key parameters of the model are calibrated using the
attention measure and empirical moments from the sections above. Using the quantitative
model, we explore the effects of inattention on monetary policy.
1.5.1 Model environment
The model mechanism is an extension of the stylized model outlined in Section 1.3. Time
is discrete and infinite. The economy consists of households, firms and the central bank.
Households and the central bank have full information about the economy, while firms face
information frictions. We start with a standard general equilibrium model with rationally
inattentive firms as in Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) and Afrouzi and Yang (2021).
Attention is modeled with the Shannon mutual information following Sims (2003) and is an
endogenous choice by the firm (Luo et al., 2017). Then we incorporate heterogeneous costs
of information and connect model objects to the data to calibrate parameters for information
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frictions.






βt(logCt − ψNt), (1.5)
where Nt denotes the labor supply and ψ represents the disutility of labor. Consumption Ct












where εp is the elasticity of substitution. In addition to the wage income, households have
access to a one-period bond Bt with the interest rate ιt and receive a lump-sum transfer Dt
from the government. The household budget constraint is given by:
1∫
0
PitCitdi+Bt ≤ WtNt + (1 + ιt)Bt−1 +Dt (1.7)
Central Bank The central bank targets aggregate money supply similar to Caplin and
Spulber (1987) and Gertler and Leahy (2008). As a result, the nominal aggregate demand
follows an autoregressive process:
∆ logQt = ρ∆ logQt−1 + νt, νt ∼ N(0, σ2ν). (1.8)




Figure 1.5: Firm’s timeline
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which captures the expected reduction in entropy from prior Qi,t|t−1 to posterior Qi,t|t. The
Shannon mutual information is decreasing in the posterior variance, so that more precise
posteriors are more expensive. The marginal cost of information per nat, 2ωi is heterogeneous
across firms and can be either high or low:
ωi ∈ {ωH , ωL}.
This heterogeneity is motivated by our empirical finding of polarized firm attention.
Figure 1.5 shows a firm’s timeline. It enters a period with a prior on the aggregate
demand. Then it chooses the posterior distribution. Since the Shannon mutual information
in (1.9) does not depend on the posterior mean, it is optimal for a firm to center the posterior
distribution around the true mean. So the firm’s information choice is only of the posterior
variance σ2i,t|t. Based on the chosen posterior distribution, the firm receives a signal on the
aggregate demand and sets its price Pit based on the posterior belief. Then, the aggregate
demand is realized, the firm produces and enters the next period with a new prior.
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A firm’s value function is given by





(Pit −MCt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow op. profits
− 2ωiI(Qi,t|t−1, Qi,t|t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
info costs
+β V (σ2i,t+1|t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cont. value
∣∣∣∣ σ2i,t|t], (1.10)
which consists of flow operational profits that are maximized when firms successfully track the
aggregate demand, information costs that depend on firms’ information acquisition choices,
and a continuation value. The expectation operator of a firm is based on its time-t informa-
tion set. The problem of a firm’s manager in each period is to maximize the firm value by
jointly setting prices and investing in attention.






ν (law of motion for prior)
0 ≤ σ2i,t|t ≤ σ2i,t|t−1 (no forgetting)
The demand function comes from the household’s problem, and the law of motion for a
firm’s prior belief is derived from the central bank’s monetary rule. The no-forgetting con-
straint prohibits firms from discarding previously-acquired information to make room for
new information, ensuring the Shannon information costs are non-negative.
Equilibrium The equilibrium consists of the household allocation, {Ct, {Cit}i∈[0,1], Nt}t,
firms allocations, {σ2i,t|t, Pit, Yit}t, and a set of prices {Pt,Wt}t such that:
1. Given prices and the firms’ choices, the household optimizes (1.5);
2. Given an initial prior σ2i,0|−1, prices and the households’ choices, firms optimize (1.10);
3. Monetary policy follows (1.8);
4. All markets clear.
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Model Solution Following Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) and Afrouzi and Yang
(2021), we approximate firm’s flow profits with second order log approximations around
the full-information steady state.6 This approximation yields an imperfect-information
firm value, ṽ. We decompose a firm’s total value under log approximation, v, into a full-
information value, v∗, representing the firm’s value under optimal pricing with full infor-
mation, and the imperfect information value, ṽ, representing the loss in firm value from
imperfect information.
The firm’s imperfect information problem is solved numerically using the algorithm for
dynamic rational inattention problems (DRIPs) developed by Afrouzi and Yang (2021).
1.5.2 Calibration
Calibration features two sets of parameters: standard parameters unrelated to information
frictions and parameters related to information frictions. Importantly, we calibrate parame-
ters related to information frictions to match the stylized facts on attention and the empirical
elasticities estimated in the empirical analysis.
Standard parameters The top panel of Table 1.3 shows the calibration for predetermined
parameters. The model period is a quarter, so the discount rate is set as β = 0.951/4. The
monetary shock process is calibrated using quarterly US nominal output between 1994 and
2019. To match our empirical specification, which compares firms within a sector, we restrict
our attention to nominal output in the manufacturing sector. The persistence of the shock is
calibrated to ρ = 0.89 and the standard deviation is calibrated to σν = 0.063. The elasticity
of substitution is set to εp = 11, implying a steady-state markup of 10%, and the disutility of
labor is set to ψ = 0.91 to offset the steady-state distortions from monopolistic competition.
6Details of the approximation can be found in Appendix A.6.1. Log-quadratic approximation is a common
simplifying assumption in rational inattention models to address the curse of dimensionality that arises from
firms having the joint distribution of prices and nominal aggregate demand as the state variable. Sims
(2003) shows that the optimal distribution under Gaussian priors and quadratic payoffs is also Gaussian, so





β discount rate 0.951/4
ρ shock persistence 0.89
σν shock std. dev. 0.063
εp elasticity of substitution 11
ψ disutility of labor 0.91
Information-friction parameters
θ fraction of attentive firms 65%
ωL cost of information 30
ωH cost of information 47
Information-friction parameters The bottom panel of Table 1.3 contains calibrations
for parameters (θ, ωL, ωH). To calibrate these important parameters governing the degree
of information frictions in the model, we use our text-based measure of attention and the
empirical moments from Section 1.4.
The fraction of attentive firms is set to θ = 65% to match the average fraction of firms
that have paid attention to the keyword “economic conditions” over the sample period.
Attention to economic conditions conveys firm attention to aggregate demand, which is a
direct counterpart of the model state variable that firms track.
To calibrate the costs of attention, ωL and ωH , we target regression coefficients in Table
1.2 by running the same regressions with simulated model data. We first define model objects
that match those observed in the data. Stock returns in the model are defined as the log
change in a firm’s value function in Equation (1.10), rit = log Vit − logEt−1(Vit). We define
attention in the model to be the Shannon mutual information. Since our main empirical
specification uses the prevalence attention measure, we define a corresponding attention
indicator, dit, to equal 1 when a firm’s attention is above the cross-sectional mean in a given
period and 0 otherwise. Finally, we use νt as the monetary shocks. We simulate the model
for a panel of 100 firms and for 1000 quarters, discarding the first 100 quarters as burn-in.
The cost of information for inattentive firms, ωH , is calibrated to target β̂v in Column
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Figure 1.6: Sensitivity of simulated moments to costs of information
















Notes: Simulated moments for a range of costs of information parameters. We simulate models for a panel of
100 firms and for 1000 periods with 100 periods burn-ins. Simulated moments are generated with regressions
discussed in the text.
(2) of Table 1.2, which measures the average response of stock returns to monetary policy.
With simulated data, we run the following regression:
rit = c+ βvνt + βddit + βdvditνit + εit,
and set ωH so that the simulated βv matches the empirical moment β̂v. The left panel of
Figure 1.6 shows how ωH is identified. We simulate the model for a range of values of ωH . As
the costs of information for attentive firms ωH increases, the average response to monetary
policy βv increases monotonically.
For a given ωH , we then set the cost of information for attentive firms, ωL, to match β̂dv+
and β̂dv− in Column (3) of Table 1.2, which measure the heterogeneous return semi-elasticity
to monetary policy. The distance between ωH and ωL reflects the relative cost of information
for inattentive firms compared to attentive firms. We run the regression with simulated data:
rit = c+ β11v>0 + βv+vt1v>0 + βv−vt1v<0 + βddit + βdv+ditνit1v>0 + βdv−ditνit1v<0 + εit
In particular, the elasticity from Column (3) we target is 1
2
|β̂dv+|+ 12 |β̂dv−|, which measures the
relative stock return losses of firms that do not pay attention. The right panel of Figure 1.6
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shows how ωL is identified. Given a value of ωH , we simulate the model for a range of ωL. As
ωL increases and the gap between ωH and ωL narrows, the simulated elasticity monotonically
decreases, implying lowering heterogeneity between attentive and inattentive firms. Figure
A.5 in the appendix shows how simulated estimates of βdv+ and βdv− change as a function of
ωL. βdv+ is positive and βdv− is negative, suggesting that the stock returns of attentive firms
outperform those of their inattentive peers for both positive and negative monetary shocks.
As ωL increases and the gap between the information costs for attentive and inattentive
firms narrows, βdv+ decreases and βdv− increases, implying a smaller difference in attention
between attentive and inattentive firms.
The information cost parameters are calibrated to ωL = 30 and ωH = 47.
7 The calibra-
tion implies significant information costs for firms, which might seem surprising considering
macroeconomic series are freely available. However, as plant-level evidence by Zbaracki et
al. (2004) suggests, information costs involve not only information gathering costs but also
information processing costs and communication costs. More recently, Abis and Veldkamp
(2020) estimate the data production function which takes labor and capital inputs to process
unstructured data into structure data and analyze data to produce knowledge. It requires
significant manpower and expertise to process, summarize and forecast macroeconomic series
into sufficient statistics that aids a firm’s investment, production and pricing decisions, as
highlighted in Reis (2006). The parameters of information costs in our model represent the
costs of both acquiring and processing information.
1.5.3 Model dynamics
We now study how firm inattention results in monetary non-neutrality. Figure 1.7 shows
the impulse responses to expansionary and contractionary monetary shocks of one standard
7The only preceding calibration for firm cost of attention is Afrouzi (2020), which studies the rational
inattention problem of New Zealand firms under strategic complementarity and calibrates ω = 0.3 using
firm beliefs reported in New Zealand surveys. Our calibration differs by the sample of US firms and the
abstraction from strategic complementarity. Flynn and Sastry (2021) build upon our calibration strategy of
matching conditional regression moments to study countercyclical attention.
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Figure 1.7: Firm impulse responses to monetary shocks
(a) Firm prices and operating profits
































(b) Conditional realized returns












































Notes: Firm impulse responses to a one standard deviation positive (expansionary) monetary shock and
negative (contractionary) shock. Impulse responses are in percent deviations from the perfect-information
steady state. “demand” refers the nominal aggregate demand. “attn” refers to the impulse responses of
attentive firms, “inattn” refers to the impulse responses of inattentive firms.
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deviation. Inattentive firms are shown in red, and attentive firms are shown in blue. Panel
(a) shows the responses of firms’ prices and flow operating profits. As nominal aggregate
demand rises, firms’ prices respond sluggishly, reflecting partial incorporation of noisy signals
about demand. Attentive firms track aggregate demand better than inattentive firms and
exhibit more responsive prices. Since we approximate firm profits around the full-information
steady state, any deviation from the full-information benchmark results in a loss. Inattentive
firms experience greater operational losses because they have less precise information about
the aggregate demand. Inattentive firms also pay higher information costs despite acquiring
less information because they face a higher marginal cost of information. With a constant
marginal cost of information, firms’ equilibrium choice of attention is not time-varying and
therefore does not result in a change in returns.
Panel (b) shows the responses of stock returns. Following an expansionary monetary
shock, full-information equity returns of both attentive and inattentive firms increase, since
firms are monopolistically competitive. Returns of attentive firms increase by more than
those of inattentive firms because attentive firms track the optimal price more closely. Re-
turns of both imperfect-information firms are lower than those of a full-information firm that
sets the optimal price. Following a contractionary shock, returns of attentive firms drop by
less than those of inattentive firms.
In Figure 1.8, we study the aggregate responses of output and inflation to a one standard
deviation expansionary monetary shock by aggregating attentive and inattentive firms.
In response to a nominal aggregate demand shock equivalent to a 25 basis point interest
rate cut8, annualized inflation and output increase by 0.04% and 0.07% at their peak, re-
spectively. As a benchmark, Christiano et al. (2005) estimates the annualized peak effect of
monetary policy shocks as 0.2% for inflation and 0.5% for output. With information as the
only source of friction, our model generates about one seventh of their output response.
8Our model considers monetary policy shock to the nominal aggregate demand and Christiano et al.
(2005) consider shocks to the interest rate. In Appendix A.6.3 we estimate the passthrough of interest rate
on the nominal aggregate demand with manufacturing output data.
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Figure 1.8: Aggregate responses to expansionary monetary shock
























Notes: Impulse responses of inflation and output. The right scales show the impulse responses to a one
standard deviation expansionary monetary shock, and the right scales show the impulse responses to an
equivalent of 25 basis point expansionary monetary policy shock. Impulse responses are in percent devia-
tions from the perfect-information steady state. “attn” refers to the impulse responses of attentive firms,
“inattn” refers to the impulse responses of inattentive firms, and “aggregate” refers to the aggregate impulse
responses.
1.5.4 Inattention and the efficacy of monetary policy
In our rational inattention model, monetary non-neutrality increases with both the fraction
of inattentive firms and cost of information acquisition. Section 1.2 documents that firm
attention evolves countercyclically over the business cycle, with attention rising during both
the 2001 recession and the Great Recession.
The countercyclicality of aggregate attention suggests an important insight about the ef-
ficacy of monetary policy: when the Federal Reserve cuts rates during an ongoing recession,
monetary policy is less powerful because firms are likely paying more attention to central
bank decision-making. With a higher fraction of attentive firms, information frictions are
less severe, monetary policy is closer to neutral, and monetary stimulus has a smaller effect
on output. In contrast, preemptive monetary policy measures aimed at averting a poten-
tial recession are more powerful because a smaller fraction of firms are likely to respond
attentively.
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Table 1.4: Attention and monetary non-neutrality
Least attentive Baseline Most attentive
Fraction of attentive firms (θ) 56% 65% 73%
Average output response (%) 0.1016 0.0992 0.0971
Notes: Dependence of output responses on the fraction of attentive firms in the economy. Average output
responses are calculated over 50 periods. Calibration for the least and most attentive economy is described
in the main text.
To illustrate the quantitative scope of the effect, we exogenously vary the fraction of
attentive firms in the model and measure the average responses to a one standard deviation
expansionary monetary shock. We start with the baseline calibration for the fraction of
attentive firms, θbaseline = 65%, which is the time series average of the prevalence measure
of firm attention to aggregate demand between 1994 and 2019. Then, we decompose the
time series of attention into the trend and cyclical components with the HP filter:
dt = τt + ζt + ξt
where τt, ζt and ξt denote the trend, cyclical and error components of the attention measure
dt, respectively. The series frequency is annual and the smoothing parameter for the HP
filter is set to 400. We then add the minimum (maximum) of the cyclical component to the
baseline calibration to form the most (least) attentive calibration of the model:
θleast attn = θbaseline +min(ζt)
θmost attn = θbaseline +max(ζt)
where min(ζt) and max(ζt) correspond to the minimum and maximum of the HP-filtered
prevalence measure in the left panel of Figure 1.2. Therefore, θleast attn = 56% and θmost attn =
73%.
Then we study how aggregate responses to monetary policies change as we vary the
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fraction of attentive firms in the economy. Table 1.4 shows the average responses of output
relative to the steady state over 50 periods. The average output response to monetary policy
is 5% weaker in the most attentive calibration compared to the least attentive calibration.
This suggests if the Federal Reserve cuts rates in the depth of a crisis period such as the
COVID-19 pandemic when all firms are paying attention to macroeconomic policies, its
monetary stimulus will be 5% weaker than if it cuts rates in a preemptive fashion to lean
against the wind. This result is consistent with studies on the state dependency of monetary
policy that find US monetary policy to be weaker in recessions than in expansions (Tenreyro
and Thwaites, 2016).
1.6 Conclusion
The empirical evidence of information frictions that we document in this paper, along with
growing evidence in the literature (Candia et al., 2021), highlights firms’ deviation from full-
information rational expectations (FIRE) in the US. To discipline models without FIRE,
researchers require an understanding of firms’ information sets and expectations formation
processes.
In that direction, this paper presents a new text-based measure of firm attention to
macroeconomic news, which will be made available publicly and updated on an ongoing basis.
We validate that the measure indeed measures firm attention by testing for an asymmetric
prediction of rational inattention on monetary policy transmission. We show that firms that
pay attention to the FOMC have larger increases in stock returns after positive monetary
shocks and smaller decreases in stock returns after negative monetary shocks, providing
direct empirical evidence for the consequences of firm inattention.
The empirical measure can be used in combination with imperfect-information models to
ground those theories with data. We demonstrate the value of this measure in a quantitative
rational inattention model by showing that time variation in firm attention has important
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implications for the state dependency of monetary policy. In the model, average inattention
drives the degree of monetary non-neutrality. The countercyclical nature of firm attention to
macroeconomic news implies that the efficacy of monetary policy is weaker during recessions
and should be considered in policy design.
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Chapter 2
Financial Intermediaries and the Macroeconomy:
Evidence from a High-frequency Identification
Pablo Ottonello and Wenting Song
2.1 Introduction
What effect do financial intermediaries have in the macroeconomy? This question, which
has been central to macroeconomics at least since the Great Depression, received significant
attention from researchers over the last decade (see, for example Gertler and Gilchrist, 2018).
The main empirical challenge in addressing this question is that changes in macroeconomic
conditions originating outside the financial system affect the balance sheets of intermediaries,
making it challenging to isolate their aggregate effects on the economy.
In this paper, we propose a high-frequency (HF) identification strategy to study the
causal effects of financial shocks in the aggregate economy. Our empirical strategy focuses
on changes in individual financial intermediaries’ net worth in a narrow window around their
earnings announcements. In the spirit of the HF event-study approach to identify monetary-
policy shocks (surveyed in Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018b), our empirical strategy exploits
the fact that earnings announcements are lumpy, which leads to a discontinuity in the content
of financial news released around these events. Using these shocks, we document that declines
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in the market value of U.S. intermediaries’ net worth leads to substantial effects in the market
value of nonfinancial firms. These effects are more pronounced for firms with small market
capitalization and when the aggregate net worth of the financial system is low. We examine
potential channels through which intermediaries’ net worth affect nonfinancial firms and
document intermediaries’ persistent effects on borrowing costs of high-default-risk firms.
Our paper begins by constructing a HF measure of financial shocks in the U.S. econ-
omy. Our measure of financial shocks uses tick-by-tick data of intermediaries’ stock prices
in 60-minute windows around their earnings releases. We exploit the fact that publicly
traded financial intermediaries have considerable market size, so idiosyncratic news about
these intermediaries can have an effect in the aggregate economy, as in the recently proposed
“granular” identification strategy (Gabaix and Koijen, 2020). We focus on commercial and
investment banks because of their direct involvement in the external finance of nonfinancial
firms, the main focus of our analysis. The combined net worth of our sample of intermedi-
aries represents 64% of the total equity of U.S. depositary institutions in the period from
1998 to 2014. We provide three pieces of supportive evidence that these shocks reflect pri-
marily information about intermediaries from their earnings releases and not about the rest
of the economy. First, the stock price movements of intermediaries around their earnings
announcements tend to be positively associated with the component of their earnings not an-
ticipated by market participants. Second, intermediaries’ stock prices exhibit larger volatility
around earnings releases with respect to nonevent dates, which is less observed for nonfinan-
cial firms, suggesting that intermediaries’ information content around their announcements
is larger than that of other firms. Finally, using a state-of-the-art machine-learning model,
we show that financial shocks are not predictable by macroeconomic and financial variables
available prior to the shock, suggesting that financial shocks are not driven by information
in the rest of the economy available before intermediaries’ earnings have been released.
We use HF financial shocks to study the effect of changes of intermediaries’ net worth on
nonfinancial firms. We provide evidence from two empirical strategies. One is an event-study
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approach, whose identifying assumption is that, in a 60-minutes window around intermedi-
aries’ earnings announcement, changes the stock price of intermediaries releasing earnings are
driven by information contained in these announcements. The other is a heteroskedasticity-
based identification strategy (Rigobon, 2003; Rigobon and Sack, 2004; Hébert and Schreger,
2017), whose identifying assumption is that the variance of intermediaries’ stock price during
earnings-announcement events is larger than in nonevents, while those of nonfinancial firms
are the same during event and nonevent dates. Using these two strategies, we document that
a one-percent change in intermediaries’ net worth leads to a 0.4-to-0.7-percent change in the
market value of nonfinancial firms in the S&P 500. These effects are larger for small firms,
as measured by the returns of the S&P SmallCap 600 and Russell 2000 indices. Aggregate
conditions in the financial system play an important role in determining these effects; the
effects we identify are governed by periods in which the aggregate net worth for the financial
system is low.
We then study potential channels through which intermediaries affect nonfinancial firms.
Using bond-level data, we document that financial shocks have persistent effects on cor-
porate bond spreads. These effects are concentrated on spreads of high default-risk firms:
For corporate bonds rated CCC or lower, a one-percent decline in the market value of in-
termediaries’ net worth leads to 0.1–0.3-percentage-point increases in spreads in the month
following an event. These effects are observed even for individual bonds for which interme-
diaries releasing earnings have no holdings, suggesting an important role for aggregate net
worth channels (as stressed, for instance, in Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010).
Related literature Our paper is related to three strands of the literature. First, an
important body of theories argues that financial intermediaries play an important role for
macroeconomic dynamics and asset prices Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010); He and Krishna-
murthy (2011, 2013); Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). Empirical work documenting the
role of these aggregate effects have used time series methods (see, for example, Bernanke,
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2018; Gertler and Gilchrist, 2018), the combination of cross-sectional and regional data
(Gertler and Gilchrist, 2019), and model-based inference (see, for example, Christiano et
al., 2015; Herreño, 2020). Our empirical analysis provides evidence of intermediaries in the
aggregate economy, as well as for the role of aggregate intermediaries’ net worth shaping
these effects, based on a HF identification strategy. We see our method as complementary
to existing empirical work, with the advantage of requiring milder assumptions for identifi-
cation (as discussed by Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a, in the context of monetary policy
shocks).
Second, our paper is related to a large body of empirical work providing evidence that the
net worth of financial intermediaries affects firms (e.g., Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Chodorow-
Reich, 2014; Huber, 2018) and asset prices (see, for example, Coval and Stafford, 2007;
Adrian et al., 2014; He et al., 2017; Siriwardane, 2019; Morelli et al., 2019). See also He
and Krishnamurthy (2018) for a recent survey. An important element in the identification
strategy developed in this body of work is the cross-sectional exposure of firms or assets
to intermediaries. Our paper complements this literature by documenting intermediaries’
aggregate effects.
Third, our paper is related to the macroeconomic literature that seeks to use direct empir-
ical evidence to inform macroeconomic models Nakamura and Steinsson (2018b). Method-
ologically, our work is close to the HF approach to study the effect of monetary policy
shocks in the economy (see, for example, Cook and Hahn, 1989; Kuttner, 2001; Cochrane
and Piazzesi, 2002; Gürkaynak et al., 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Gorodnichenko and
Weber, 2016; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018a) and of the effects of sovereign default risk in
the economy (Hébert and Schreger, 2017).
Outline The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data used in
the empirical analysis. Section 2.3 describes the construction of the HF financial shocks and




Our measure of financial shocks uses tick-by-tick data of intermediaries’ stock prices in a
window around their earning releases. We obtain the stock-price data from the NYSE’s
Trade and Quote (TAQ) and the earnings announcements’ specific dates and times from
IBES Academic. Our baseline sample focuses on commercial banks, investment banks, and
securities dealers listed on the S&P 500 during the period 1998 to 2014.1 We focus on these
types of intermediaries because their direct involvement in lending activities in the economy
makes them more likely to be linked to the macroeconomy, our main focus of analysis. In
additional analysis, we create broader measures of financial shocks to include other types of
financial intermediaries. Table 2.1 details the set of 18 financial intermediaries selected with
our main criteria, together with the period in which they are included in our analysis. In our
period of analysis, we obtain 870 announcements of earnings, roughly four per institution–
year.
We study the effect on stock markets using daily indices data from FRED, including the
S&P 500, S&P Small Cap 600, and Russell 2000. Table B.1 presents descriptive statistics of
daily stock returns in our period of analysis, showing that days with financial shocks exhibit
descriptive statistics similar to those of the whole period of analysis. We complement this
analysis with tick-by-tick data for nonfinancial firms from TAQ.
We also study the effect of financial shocks in the corporate bond market by using daily
individual bond-level data from the constituents of the Intercontinental Exchange Bank of
America’s (ICE BofA) AAA and CCC and Lower U.S. Corporate indices. For each of these
bonds, we have information on bond option-adjusted spreads, together with characteristics
including index weightings, ratings, residual maturities, average trailing 30-day spreads, and
month-to-date changes in spreads. Following Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2020), we use the
1The financial intermediaries we use in the analysis correspond to NAICS 522110 and 523110.
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Table 2.1: Financial intermediaries included in the sample
Financial Intermediary Ticker Start End Avg Equity Share of Share of
($ billion) Sample Aggr Equity
Citicorp CCI, C 1998Q1 2014Q4 148.8 26.8% 13.2%
Bank of America BAC 1998Q1 2014Q4 136.4 24.6% 12.1%
Wells Fargo WFC 1998Q1 2014Q4 73.6 13.3% 6.5%
Goldman Sachs GS 2002Q3 2014Q4 51.7 6.8% 3.9%
Morgan Stanley MWD, MS 1998Q1 2014Q4 37.3 6.7% 3.3%
J.P. Morgan Chase CMB, JPM 1998Q1 2000Q4 36.0 1.1% 6.3%
Wachovia WB 1998Q1 2008Q4a 35.8 4.2% 4.0%
Merrill Lynch MER 1998Q1 2008Q4 25.4 3.0% 2.8%
U.S. Bankcorp USB 1998Q1 2014Q4 22.1 4.0% 2.0%
Bank One ONE 1998Q1 2004Q2b 19.8 1.3% 3.0%
Bank of New York Mellon BK 1998Q1 2014Q4 18.7 3.4% 1.7%
Fleet Boston Financial FBF 1998Q1 2004Q1c 14.9 0.9% 2.3%
Lehman Brothers LEH 1998Q1 2008Q3 12.6 1.4% 1.4%
Ameriprise Financial AMP 2005Q4 2014Q4 8.6 0.8% 0.6%
First Chicago FCN 1998Q1 1998Q4d 8.2 0.0% 1.5%
MNBA Corp KRB 1998Q1 2005Q4 7.6 0.6% 1.0%
Bankboston BKB 1998Q1 1999Q3e 4.9 0.1% 0.9%
Northern Trust NTRS 1998Q1 2014Q4 4.6 0.8% 0.4%
Mean 37.1 5.56% 3.71%
SD 42.4 8.04% 3.68%
Min 4.6 0.04% 0.41%
Max 148.8 26.82% 13.16%
Notes: This table lists the financial intermediaries included in the sample and their tickers in TAQ. “Avg
Equity” is the time series average of total shareholder equity (SEQ in Compustat) of the financial inter-
mediary. “Share of Sample” measures a financial intermediary’s equity as a share of equity of all financial
intermediaries in the sample. “Share of Aggr Equity” represents a financial intermediary’s equity as a share
of aggregate equity of U.S. depository institutions. aAcquired by Wells Fargo. bMerged with J.P. Morgan
Chase. cAcquired by Bank of America. dMerged with Banc One to form Bank One. eMerged with Fleet to
form Fleet Boston.
option-adjusted spread, defined as the amount by which the government spot curve is shifted
to match the present value of discounted cash flows to the corporate bond’s price, as the
main measure of corporate bond spread because it incorporates both a maturity adjustment
(Gilchrist et al., 2009), by computing the spread relative to a risk-free security of matching
maturity, and an option adjustment (Duffee, 1998), by removing the price of the embedded
option. The AAA index consists of 293 bonds and the CCC and Lower index consists of 3,308
bonds. Table B.2 presents descriptive statistics of the individual bond spread together with
those for days with and without earning releases of financial intermediaries, which exhibit
similar descriptive statistics.
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We analyze the heterogeneous impacts of financial shocks on corporate bond markets
using additional data from Bloomberg. We study whether the effects vary depending on
the share held by the intermediary that releases the information. For each individual bond
in our sample,2 we obtain from Bloomberg (at the CUSIP level) the share held by each
reporting financial institution. This information is available at the quarterly frequency, so
we collect data for each financial shock and for each outstanding bond on the quarter before
the shock. Table B.3 reports descriptive statistics of bond holdings. On average the financial
intermediaries in our sample represent 1,760 of the reported holdings of these bonds. These
holdings exhibit heterogeneity, with a standard deviation of 11,337, which can be used to
study the differential effects of bonds that are more or less strongly held by institutions
releasing earnings reports.
2.3 High-frequency financial shocks
2.3.1 Construction and descriptive statistics
We define the HF financial shocks as the change in the stock price of the intermediaries




θi,q(t)(logPi,τ(i,t)+∆+ − logPi,τ(i,t)−∆−), (2.1)
where It denotes the set of intermediaries reporting their announcement in day t, τ(i, t)
is the time of an announcement for institution i in day t (expressed in minutes within a
day), Pi,τ is the stock price of institution i in period τ , ∆
+ and ∆− control the size of the
window around the announcement, and θi,q(t) is the market capitalization of institution i
as a share of the total market capitalization of institutions in our sample in the quarter
before announcement day q(t). For announcements made within trading hours, we select
2To study the heterogeneous impacts of financial shocks, we restrict the sample of bonds to those rated
CCC or lower issued by firms with at least 10 bonds outstanding.
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∆(t)− to be 20 minutes before the announcement and ∆(t)+ to be 40 minutes after the
announcement, following Nakamura and Steinsson (2018a) for monetary-policy shocks. For
announcements that occur after trading hours, we compute the financial shock as change
between the closing and opening log prices. Given that our measure is more precise for
announcements made within trading hours, we create two measures of financial shocks: a
“narrow” measure that includes only this type of announcements, and a “broad” one that
includes both type of shocks. Appendix Figure B.1 illustrates our HF identified shocks with
four graphical examples. Panels (a) and (b) show two shocks that occur inside trading hours,
with their magnitudes corresponding to median positive and negative shocks inside trading
hours; Panels (c) and (d) illustrate shocks that occur outside of trading hours.
Table 2.2 reports the shocks’ descriptive statistics. The first two columns show the HF
change in log prices of reporting institutions around their earnings announcements. On
average price changes are close to zero, with a standard deviation of 2.4%. The median
positive and negative shocks are close to 1%. Shocks that occur inside trading hours exhibit
roughly similar descriptive statistics to those occurring outside market hours. The third
and fourth columns show descriptive statistics of the HF financial shocks—which, as shown
in (2.1), weights each change in log price of reporting institutions by their market share.
Weighting overall reduces the magnitude of the shocks, resulting in a standard deviation of
0.23% and median positive and negative shocks of 0.05% and −0.05%, respectively.
Summary statistics on shocks
2.3.2 Characterization of the HF financial shocks
The empirical analysis proposed in this paper relies on two properties of HF financial shocks.
Granularity Gabaix and Koijen (2020) discuss how the idiosyncratic shocks of large play-
ers in the economy that affect aggregates constitute powerful instruments. The first property
of the HF financial shocks is that they are based on the change in the net worth of large
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Table 2.2: Financial shocks
Changes in Stock Prices HF Financial Shocks
Broad Narrow Broad Narrow
Mean 0.06 −0.16 0.00 −0.03
Median + 1.07 1.22 0.05 0.06
Median − −1.08 −1.22 −0.05 −0.08
Std Deviation 2.37 2.68 0.23 0.30
5th Percentile −3.53 −4.59 −0.34 −0.56
95th Percentile 3.65 3.81 0.30 0.31
Observations 870 343 870 343
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of financial shocks. “Unweighted” shocks are constructed with
changes in stock prices of financial intermediaries as described in the main text. “Weighted” shocks are
weighted by the market net worth of the financial intermediary as a fraction of the total market net worth
of the sample in the quarter. “Narrow” refers to shocks with earning releases inside of market trading hours,
including pre-market and extended trading, if available. “Broad” refers to shocks with earning releases
outside of market trading hours. “All” includes all financial shocks. “Median +” and “Median −” refer to
median positive and median negative shocks.
financial institutions, whose individual changes in net worth represent a significant change
in the net worth of financial intermediaries of the aggregate economy. In particular, Table
2.1 shows that financial intermediaries in our sample represent 64% of the total equity of
U.S. depositary institutions, measured by the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds. In addition,
Appendix Figure B.2 shows that shocks to the market value of an intermediary releasing
earnings leads to a 0.2% increase in the market value of other financial intermediaries in the
sample that do not disclose their earnings, suggesting that the change in the market value
of intermediaries disclosing earnings do not lead to opposing forces in other intermediaries
not disclosing their earning that could offset the effects of the shocks.
Financial content The second important property of financial shocks for our empirical
analysis is that they primarily reflect information of financial intermediaries and not about
the rest of the economy where we want to study their effects. Three pieces of evidence support
this view. First, Appendix B.2.1 uses data on unexpected earnings in announcements to show
that the stock price movement from financial institutions tend to be positively associated
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with their surprise earnings, suggesting that financial shocks encode information of earnings
released in the announcements.
Second, financial shocks are not systematically linked to information available at the
moment of earnings releases. Appendix B.2.2 uses a state-of-the-art machine-learning model
and shows that the HF financial shocks are not predictable with existing macroeconomic or
financial data available before the shocks, suggesting that financial shocks are not driven by
information in the rest of the economy available before intermediaries’ earnings have been
released.
Third, Table B.4 reports the volatility of the stock price of financial intermediaries and
nonfinancial firms in events of intermediaries earnings announcements and comparing with
those of nonevent days. These moments show that the volatility of financial intermediaries’
stock prices during their earnings announcements increases by substantially more than those
of nonfinancial firms during these events, which is consistent with intermediaries’ earnings
announcements reflecting more information about financial intermediaries than about non-
financial firms. Based on this, in our empirical analysis of the next section, we conduct a
heteroskedasticity-based identification, which can be conducted even if factors of nonfinan-
cial firms affect the market value of intermediaries during their earnings announcements, as
long as the variance of intermediaries’ stock price during earnings-announcement events is
larger than in nonevent dates, while those of nonfinancial firms are the same during events
of earnings releases of financial intermediaries and nonevent dates.
2.4 The effects of financial shocks on the aggregate
economy
We now document the effect of financial shocks in the aggregate economy. Section 2.4.1
shows their effects on the market value of firms and Section 2.4.2 their effects on corporate
borrowing costs.
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2.4.1 Effects of financial shocks on the market value of nonfinan-
cial firms
Event-study approach Our first empirical strategy to study the effect of financial shocks
on the market value of nonfinancial firms is an event-time study, which consists of estimating
the regression
∆ log yt = α + βε
F
t + εt, (2.2)
where yt denotes a stock-market index for nonfinancial firms at closing date t of financial
intermediaries’ earnings announcements, and εt is a random error term. The coefficient of
interest, β, measures the elasticity of the market value of nonfinancial firms to financial
shocks. The identifying assumption to interpret these effects as causal is that, in the 60-
minute window around intermediaries’ earnings announcements, changes the stock price of
intermediaries releasing earnings are driven by information contained in these announcements
and not by other factors affecting stock prices of nonfinancial firms in an announcement-date
event, contained in εt.
Panel (A) of Table 2.3 shows the results of estimating the baseline event-study regression
(2.2). The first column shows the effects on nonfinancial firms included in the SP500, with an
estimated elasticity of 0.7. The second and third columns show the effects on the SmallCap
600 and Russell 2000, showing an elasticity of 1.1, indicating that the effects of financial
shocks are larger for small firms. Table 2.3 shows that these effects are robust if we include
in the regression only dates in which the announcements were made within trading hours
and if we include a set of macroeconomic controls in (2.2).
We conduct two “placebo” exercises to provide further evidence for our interpretation of
these event-time results. The first exercise shows that the effects we identify for financial
shocks are not found if we follow a similar procedure to identify shocks originating in non-
financial firms. To conduct this exercise, we follow a similar procedure to that developed in
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Table 2.3: Effects of financial shocks on the market value of nonfinancial firms
SP500 SmallCap Russell Obs
Ex-Fin
A. Event-Study Baseline 0.720*** 1.085*** 1.124*** 486
(0.179) (0.213) (0.229)
Narrow Windows only 0.924*** 1.348*** 1.453*** 272
(0.241) (0.296) (0.313)
Macro Controls 0.870*** 1.271*** 1.373*** 272
(0.242) (0.297) (0.314)
B. Identifcation through Baseline 0.403*** 0.477*** 0.498*** 3,532
Heteroskedasticity (0.026) (0.028) (0.029)
Macro Controls 0.399*** 0.472*** 0.492*** 3,532
(0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
C. By Aggr Net Worth Well-Capitalized 0.259 0.447 0.398 135
(0.483) (0.541) (0.599)
Under-Capitalized 1.059*** 1.535*** 1.673*** 137
(0.306) (0.390) (0.405)
D. By Institution Commercial Banks 0.918*** 1.399*** 1.456*** 336
(0.227) (0.267) (0.287)
Invm Banks & Security Dealers 0.329 0.463 0.462 252
(0.328) (0.382) (0.415)
E. By Dealer Status Primary Dealers 0.241 0.492 0.547 308
(0.281) (0.324) (0.349)
Nonprimary Dealers 1.183*** 1.684*** 1.719*** 313
(0.264) (0.310) (0.333)




tXt+εt, where yt denotes the price
of a stock index (Nonfinancial firms in the SP500, SmallCap 600, and the Russell 2000), “Baseline” shows
the results without controls Xt, “Narrow window only” shows the results for regressions that include only
the announcements made during trading hours, “With controls” shows the results including a set of monthly
macroeconomic controls in the vector Xt (industrial production and employment). Panel (B) shows the
results for identification by heteroskedasticity (following Rigobon, 2003; Rigobon and Sack, 2004), described
in Section 2.4.1.Confidence intervals were obtained following the procedure in Hébert and Schreger (2017).
First-state F-statistics are 70.26, 66.88, and 24.76 for baseline, including controls (S&P500, VIX, industrial
production, and payrolls), and using S&P 500 nonfinancial firm earnings releases as nonevents, respectively.
Panels (C) shows the results from estimating the event-study model for dates in which the financial system
exhibits different degrees of capitalization, with well- (under-)capitalized referring to when the HP-filtered
series of depository institutions’ equity capital is above (below) mean. Panel (D) shows the effects when
we decompose the HF financial shocks into those from two types of institutions, commercial banks (NAICS
code 522110) and investment banks and securities dealers (NAICS code 523110). Panel (E) shows the effects
when we decompose the HF financial shocks into those from institutions with different dealership status:
primary dealers and nonprimary dealers (Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
Section 2.3 for financial shocks, but focus on earnings announcements of nonfinancial firms
included in the Dow Jones index. Table B.5 shows the results from estimating (2.2) but using
the shock to nonfinancial firms instead of the financial shock, εFt . Results indicate a baseline
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estimate that is not statistically significant and is unstable across specifications (e.g., has a
negative point estimate when we use the narrow version of the shocks, only announcements
during trading hours). Furthermore, the point estimates are smaller when we study their
impact in smaller firms, suggesting that the effects that we identify in our empirical model
are specific for financial intermediaries.
The second placebo exercise, shown in Appendix Figure B.3, shows that the HF shocks
do not have an effect on the market value of nonfinancial firms during the days before the
shock, suggesting that the effects are not driven by pretrends. This figure also shows that
the HF shocks do not have an impact on the days after the shocks, suggesting that the
information in financial shocks are incorporated into the value of nonfinancial firms in the
day of the shock and that there are not offsetting forces in consecutive days that revert the
impact effects of these shocks.
Heteroskedasticity-based identification One potential concern about the event-time
study approach is that factors unrelated to the release of earnings of intermediaries may
ultimately be related to the stock prices of nonfinancial firms even within a narrow window
around earnings announcements. We address this concern by conducting an alternative esti-
mation based on a heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy (Rigobon, 2003; Rigobon
and Sack, 2004). This strategy can be conducted even if other factors of nonfinancial firms
do affect the market value of intermediaries during their earnings announcements, as long
as the variance of intermediaries’ stock price during earnings-announcement events dates is
larger than in nonevents dates, while those of nonfinancial firms are the same during earning
releases of financial intermediaries and nonevent dates.
To conduct the estimation based on identification through heteroskedasticity, we consider
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the bivariate model,
∆νt = βF∆xt + Γ
′
FXt + ηFt
∆yt = β∆νt + Γ
′Xt + ηt,
where ∆νt is the log change in a value-weighted index of intermediaries’ stock prices in period
t and Xt is a vector of control variables. Unlike the event-time analysis estimating (2.2), the
heteroskedasticity-based approach uses data from both dates in which intermediaries release
their announcements and those in which they do not. We estimate the coefficient of interest
and its confidence interval following the procedure described in Hébert and Schreger (2017).
We use 1,000 repetitions of a stratified bootstrap, resampling with replacement from events
and nonevents.
Panel (B) of Table 2.3 shows the results from estimating the effects of financial shocks
on nonfinancial firms using the heteroskedasticity-based approach. The estimated elasticity
is 0.4, which, although smaller than the point estimate from the event-study approach, is
statistically significant and economically relevant. Using this approach, we also find that
small firms are more impacted, as measured by those in the SmallCap 600 and the Russell
2000.
Additional results Table 2.3 provides three additional results, decomposing the effects
of financial shocks on nonfinancial firms. First, Panel (C) shows that the effect of financial
shocks on nonfinancial firms are driven by their effects in dates in which the financial system
is undercapitalized (i.e., when the market value of intermediaries’ net worth is below its
HP trend). When the financial system is well-capitalized, the effects of financial shocks on
nonfinancial firms are economically small and statistically insignificant. This result indicates
that a key component driving the general equilibrium effects of intermediaries in the economy
are the overall conditions of the financial system.
Panels (D) and (E) decompose financial shocks by institution type. Panel (D) shows
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that the effects are stronger for commercial banks (NAICS code 522110) than for investment
banks and security dealers (NAICS code 523110). Panel (E) shows that the effects are driven
by institutions that are nonprimary dealers. Examples of nonprimary commercial banks in
our sample include Ameriprise, Bank of America, Bank One, BankBoston, Fleet Boston,
Keycorp, MBNA, Northern Trust, Bank of New York Mellon, U.S. Bancorp, Wachovia, and
Wells Fargo. As these intermediaries play an important role in the lending to nonfinancial
firms, these results are consistent with the lending channel playing an important role in the
effect of intermediaries on firms. The next section further analyzes this channel by studying
the effect of financial shocks on the corporate bond market.
2.4.2 Effects of financial shocks on corporate borrowing costs
We study the effect of financial shocks on corporate bond spreads by estimating the Jordà
(2005) local projections,
∆hzijt = αhj + βhjε
F
t + ϵijth, (2.3)
where zijt is the spread of bond i with credit rating j in period t of earnings announce-
ments, and h ≥ 0 indexes days after these announcements. As described in Section 2.2, for
this analysis, we use daily individual bond-level data from the constituents of Intercontinen-
tal Exchange Bank of America (ICE BofA). The coefficient of interest, βhj, measures the
semielasticity of corporate bonds of rating j to financial shocks at horizon h.
Figure 2.1 reports the effects of estimating (2.3) for different credit ratings and time
horizons. Panel (a) shows that financial shocks have no significant effects on the option-
adjusted spreads of AAA-rated bonds. Panel (b) shows that financial shocks have a persistent
effect on the spreads of bonds with a rating CCC or lower rating. The magnitude of these
effects indicate that a one-percent decline in the market value of intermediaries’ net worth
leads to 0.1–0.3-percentage-point increases in spreads in the month following an event.
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Figure 2.1: Effects of financial shocks on corporate bond spreads
(a) AAA Spreads (b) CCC Spreads
Notes: The figures show the estimated cumulative responses, βh, of bond spreads to HF shocks at horizon
h from estimating local projections
∆hzijt = αhj + βhjε
F
t .
The left panel reports the responses of nonfinancial constituent bonds in the AAA index, and the right panel
reports the responses of nonfinancial constituent bonds in the CCC or Lower index. Solid lines represent
point estimates of the local projection at each horizon, and dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals.
To further understand the mechanisms through which financial shocks affect the spreads
of corporate bonds Table 2.4 uses data on bond holdings of individual financial intermediaries.
The first column of the table reports the impact effect, which is the same as that reported in
Panel (B) of Figure 2.1 for h = 0. The second column of the table reports the effects for bonds
that are held by financial intermediaries reporting earnings announcements and those that
are not held by these intermediaries. Results are larger for bonds for which intermediaries
releasing earnings have positive holdings, which is consistent with the view that financial
institutions acquire specialized knowledge about certain bonds for trading purposes and that,
in the presence of trading frictions, financial shocks have larger impact in the prices of these
bonds (see, for example, Morelli et al., 2019). However, results also indicate substantial
effects for bonds that are not held by financial intermediaries releasing information, with an
impact semielasticity of −0.07, suggesting the importance of aggregate net worth of financial
intermediaries affecting corporate borrowing costs (as stressed, for instance, in Gertler and
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Table 2.4: Effects of financial shocks on corporate bond spreads




Fin shock ×1(ek,it−1 > 0) -0.123∗∗∗
(0.034)




Firm fixed effect ✓ ✓
Notes: This table shows the effects of a bond’s exposure to an intermediary on how spreads respond to the
shocks generated by the intermediary. The specification in Column (2) takes the form:
∆cskj(i)t = δi + β1 · νt · 1(ekj(i)t−1 > 0) + β2 · νt · 1(ekj(i)t−1 = 0) + εkj(i)t,
where ∆cskj(i)t is the change in spreads of bond j issued by firm i around the earning release of bank k
in day t; δi is a firm fixed effect; and ekj(i)t−1 is the share of bond j issued by firm i that is held by bank
k, measured at the previous quarter of the earning release. Control variables include industrial production,
nonfarm payrolls, recession indicator, bond remaining maturity, average spreads in the previous 30 days,
and month-to-date changes in spreads.
Kiyotaki, 2010).
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a new measure of financial shocks, based on the HF change in
the market value around intermediaries’ earnings announcements. We then exploited the
“granularity” of financial shocks, stemming from the fact that U.S. publicly traded financial
intermediaries have considerable size, to study the effects of financial shocks in the aggregate
economy. We document intermediaries’ substantial effects on the market value and borrowing
costs of nonfinancial firms. The effects are stronger for small firms and when the financial
system is undercapitalized.
The HF financial shocks developed in the paper can be directly used by researchers
conducting empirical research in macroeconomics, similarly to the large body of evidence
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developed using HF monetary-policy shocks. Our empirical findings about the effect of in-
termediaries in the aggregate economy can also be useful to be combined with macrofinance
models aimed at understanding role of financial frictions determining the aggregate trans-








Political narratives shape ideological diversity (Gentzkow et al., 2014), political polarization
(Levy, 2021), and asset prices (Bianchi et al., 2021). Less studied, however, is the role of
economic narratives. As Shiller (2020) points out:
We need to incorporate the contagion of narratives into economic theory. Oth-
erwise, we remain blind to a very real, very palpable, very important mechanism
for economic change, as well as a crucial element for economic forecasting.
This paper develops an empirical framework to study the role of economic narratives. The
empirical analysis is motivated by Shiller (2017), who models the contagion of economic
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The total population, N , is divided into three compartments: S, the number of “susceptibles”
who are vulnerable to a narrative, I, the number of “infected” who believe in a narrative and
can further convince their friends of it, and R, the number of “recovereds” who have moved
on from the narrative. Whether a narrative becomes “viral” depends on two parameters:
the contagion rate c > 0 and the recovery rate r > 0.
The paper provides evidence on the empirical importance of economic narratives and also
estimates the values of the contagion rates c.
I start by developing a procedure to capture economic narratives. In Eliaz and Spiegler
(2020), narratives are defined as causal models (directed acyclic graphs) that map actions into
outcomes, while weaving other random variables into the story. In the context of media-
created macroeconomic narratives, I define “narratives” as the media’s interpretations of
how policies affect macroeconomic outcomes. Applying topic models from natural language
processing on the news articles devoted to an economic event, I obtain empirical estimates
of both the prevailing narratives and each article’s reliance on the narratives.
I then study the empirical importance of the identified narratives and estimate the extent
of contagion. Social media provides an ideal platform to monitor a narrative’s popularity
and influence. The microblogging service Twitter, in particular, is widely used for news
dissemination and commentary. I use quote retweeting activities on Twitter to measure
users’ exposure to a given narrative and trace the sentiment changes displayed in users’
tweets after their exposure.
Applying the framework to study the 2019 yield curve inversion, a recession indicator
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in the US (Harvey, 1988), I show that economic narratives significantly affect consumer
sentiment: consumers exposed to the negative narrative of an imminent recession display
a more pessimistic outlook, while consumers exposed to the positive narrative of recession
concerns being overblown experience no change in their sentiment.
Related literature The paper is related to three strands of the literature. First, it is
most closely related to the literature on economic narratives, which have received several
different formalizations. Eliaz and Spiegler (2020) define narratives as causal models which
map actions into outcomes. Shiller (2017) defines narratives as catchy stories, measures
the popularity of narratives using Google search frequencies, and models narratives using
an epidemiology model. Bénabou et al. (2018) study moral decision making and define
narratives as signals that affect agents’ beliefs on the externality of their actions. This paper
focuses on empirical testing for the importance of narratives. The definition of narratives
follows Shiller (2017) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2020), both of whom represent narratives as
models that piece together actions, outcomes, and a selected subset of data. Diverging from
the empirical approach in Shiller (2017), the framework proposed in this paper does not
require researchers to identify the narratives ex ante and, therefore, allows for real-time
detection and tracking of narratives.
Second, the paper relates to a growing literature which uses natural language processing
to study the economic effects of news, such as Bybee et al. (2020), Nyman et al. (2021)
and Calomiris and Mamaysky (2019). In particular, Larsen and Thorsrud (2019) study
the effects of narratives on business cycle fluctuations, defining narratives as significant
economic events that are extracted empirically using topic models on the corpus of Wall
Street Journal articles. The differences between this paper and previous ones stem from
the different theoretical definitions of narratives. Narratives in this paper are news media’s
different interpretations of the same underlying economic event, extracted using topic models
on the articles on the given event. In addition, the data of retweeting activities provides
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estimates of the contagion rate of a narrative.
Third, the paper relates to the empirical literature of belief formation, which points
to personal experiences (Malmendier and Nagel, 2016), salience (Cavallo et al., 2017) and
heuristics (Bordalo et al., 2018), among others, as important drivers of individuals’ expecta-
tions. This paper contributes to the literature by highlighting the role of economic narratives
in shaping sentiment.
Outline The rest of the paper lays out the empirical framework using the yield curve
inversion as an example. Section 3.2 describes the yield curve inversion event. Section 3.3
formally defines narratives in the context of the inversion. Section 3.4 conducts the empirical
analysis. The empirical section starts with the specification of the empirical model in Section
3.4.1. Then it describes the data sources and empirical approaches used to construct each
component of the empirical model: Section 3.4.2 introduces the topic model and data sources
used to capture narratives; Section 3.4.3 describes the measure of narrative exposure based
on retweeting activities; Section 3.4.4 describes the measure of consumer sentiment obtained
using a näıve Bayes classifier. Section 3.4.5 assembles the components and reports the
empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Yield curve inversion
Harvey (1988) connects expected consumption growth to the term spread of yield curve and
documents the predictive power of the yield curve inversion for major recessions from the
1960s to the 1980s. Since then, the yield curve inversion has been a closely-watched and
reliable recession indicator in the US. Figure C.1 in the Appendix shows that the spread
between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury bond yields has turned negative within 12 months
before every recession in the US for the past 40 years.
As expected, the yield curve inversion in 2019 has attracted a lot of attention. Figure 3.1b
shows that Google searches for the term “yield curve” spiked before and during the inversions
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of the yield curve inversion episode







































Notes: Panel (a) shows the spread between 10-year treasury yield and 3-month treasury yield (“10Y3M”)
and the spread between 10-year treasury yield and 2-year treasury yield (“10Y2Y”) in 2019. Dates when
the spreads first turn negative and revert back to positive are annotated. Panel (b) shows the Google search
frequency for the term “yield curve” in 2019. The highest search frequency has been scaled to be 100.
of both the 10-year-over-2-year (10Y2Y) term spread and the 10-year-over-3-month (10Y3M)
term spread, with a peak of the searches right before the inversion of the most wildly-watched
10Y2Y spread.
Against the backdrop of a booming labor market and the longest expansion in US history,
the yield curve inversion in 2019 has received several different interpretations in the media.
The first interpretation is that a recession is looming. An example of such a recession
narrative is Cristina Alesci’s article for CNN1:
1“Fact-checking Peter Navarro’s claims that the yield curve is not inverted” by Cristina Alesci on August
19, 2019. Link to the article on CNN.
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Navarro is wrong on two fronts: The inversion did happen, and it’s not a good
sign for the economy. Although the inversion was brief and small, major banks
took note of it. [...] Yield curve inversions often signal recessions, which is why
economic prognosticators pay so much attention to them.
which draws on the track record yield curve inversion to predict a recession and paints
a negative picture on the economic outlook. The second interpretation is that the yield
curve inversion is no longer an informative signal. Peter Coy illustrates such a narrative for
Bloomberg2:
Well, guess what, folks? It’s still rainbows and pots of gold out there. Contrary
to what seems to have become the overnight conventional wisdom in politics, a
recession before Election Day 2020 remains a less than 50-50 proposition.
which goes on to explain that the long end of the yield curve has been trending down
because of low and stable inflation and the strong fundamentals of the economy, suggesting
that recession concerns are overblown. The third is a neutral coverage, providing both sides
of the previous narratives. An example of such coverage is Brian Chappatta’s Bloomberg
article3, explaining the nature of the yield curve and the historical significance of its inversion:
What’s a yield curve? [...] What are flat and inverted yield curves? [...] Why
does it matter?
which defines an inverted yield curve, explains its history of proceeding recessions, but does
not draw any conclusions of what the inversion implies for the current economy.
Do these narratives influence the outlook of their readers? And if so, how much influence
does each narrative have? Before answering the questions empirically, I first formally define
“narratives” within the context of the yield curve inversion.
2“What a Yield-Curve Inversion Really Says About the U.S. Economy: A reliable recession indicator has
lost some of its power to predict” by Peter Coy on August 22, 2019. Link to the article on Bloomberg.
3“The Yield Curve Is Inverted! Remind Me Why I Care” by Brian Chappatta. Link to the article on
Bloomberg.
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3.3 Theoretical definition of narratives
As in Eliaz and Spiegler (2020), a narrative is represented by a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
Acyclicity means that the graph contains no directed path from a node to itself and therefore
can be interpreted as a causal model. A news reporter forms the narrative of how the
economic policy, a, influences the economic outcome, y. Both a and y take binary values:
a = 0 (1) denotes the current (counterfactual) policy, and y = 0 (1) denotes a recession
(an expansion). The reporter has the option to weave the yield curve inversion into the
narrative. Let s denote the slope of the yield curve. s = 0 represents an inverted yield curve,
while s = 1 represents the common upward-sloping yield curve.
An objective narrative, G1, points out that the slope of the yield curve is influenced by
a variety of factors, θ, such as economic fundamentals, investor expectations, and market
liquidity. These economic fundamentals are what ultimately determine the outcome y. Such
a narrative can be represented by the DAG:
G1 : a→ s← θ → y
Under the narrative G1, there is no direct causal link between the inverted yield curve and a
recession. On the other hand, a sensationalized narrative connects the inverted yield curve
to an imminent recession. Such a narrative can be represented by the DAG:
G2 : a→ s→ y
Under the narrative G2, the current economic policy is directly responsible for the inversion
of the yield curve, which will lead to a recession.
Consumers who are exposed to these narratives would then form different subjective
beliefs. Let x = (a, s, θ, y) denote the collection of the aforementioned variables. Readers of
G1 recognize that the inverted yield curve is merely a symptom of economic fundamentals
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and policies. To them, the inverted yield curve does not necessarily predict a recession:
pG1(x) = p(a)p(θ)p(s|a, θ)p(y|θ)
In contrast, readers of G2 perceive a direct causal link between the yield curve inversion and
a recession:
pG2(x) = p(a)p(s|a)p(y|a, s)
Appendix C.2 makes functional form assumptions on payoffs and long-run probabilities to
illustrate how G1 and G2 can co-exist in the steady state. Given the historical correlation
between the yield curve inversions and recessions, the sensationalized narrative is not in-
consistent with the data. Its causal structure predicts a better future if consumer switch
to the counterfactual policy, promising higher expected utility under the subjective belief.
As more consumers switch to the counterfactual policy, the gap between the current and
counterfactual policies shrink, diminishing the sensationalized narrative’s ability to promise
a higher payoff, which leads to an equilibrium policy under which both narratives co-exist.
The general definitions follow the Bayesian network literature (Spiegler, 2016; Eliaz and
Spiegler, 2020). First, I define policy and outcomes, which are components of a narrative.
Definition 3 (policy and outcome). Let X = X1 × · · · × Xm be a finite set of states with
Xi = {0, 1} for each i = 1, · · · ,m with m > 2. For every N ⊆ {1, · · · ,m}, denote XN =∏
i∈N Xi. For any x ∈ X, x1 and xm, denoted a and y, are the economic policy and the
economic outcome.
In the example of the yield curve, m = 4 and X = X1×X2×X3×X4 = A×S×Θ×Y .
The full set of states XN1 where N1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} contains the element x1 = (a, s, θ, y), and
a partial set of states XN2 where N2 = {1, 2, 4} contains the element x2 = (a, s, y). Both x1
and x2 contain the policy, a, and the outcome, y.
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Definition 4 (narrative). A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a pair of nodes and directed
links G = (N,R), where N ⊆ {1, · · · ,m} is a set of nodes and R ⊆ N×N is a set of directed
links. Acyclicity excludes directed path from a node to itself. Let G be a collection of DAGs.
Then a narrative is an element G ∈ G satisfying:
1. {1,m} ⊆ N , that is, all feasible narratives contain policies and outcomes;
2. |N | ≤ n where n ∈ {2, · · · ,m}, that is, narratives have a maximum complexity;
3. 1 is an ancestral node, that is, the policy has no prior causes.
Definition 5 (subjective belief). Let iRj denote a directed link from node i to the node j,
and let R(i) = {j ∈ N | jRi} denote the set of prarent nodes of i. Suppose p is the objective






Both aforementioned narratives of the yield curve inversion satisfy Definition 4. The
narrative a → s ← θ → y can be represented with the DAG: G1 = (N1, R1), where the
nodes N1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the links R1 = (1R2, 3R2, 3R4). The sensationalized narrative
a → s → y can be represented by the DAG: G2 = (N2, R2), where N2 = {1, 2, 4} and
R2 = (1R2, 2R4).
G1 treats the inverted yield curve as an exogenous factor which is not a consequence of
the economic policy and only one of the factors determining the economic outcome. Under
this narrative, the recession risk is overblown. Therefore, I refer to it as the “overblown”
narrative:
Govb : current economic policy → yield curve inversion← other factors→ recession
The coverage by Bloomberg’s Peter Coy is an example of such narrative. It states that even
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though the yield curve has inverted, the economic fundamentals are solid, which implies
a low recession risk. Readers who are exposed to the overblown narrative form no causal
link between the inversion and the recession. Their subjective beliefs of the event follow
pGovb(x) = p(a)p(θ)p(s|a, θ)p(y|θ).
In contrast, G2 weaves in an inverted yield curve as being causal of a recession. Under
this narrative, the inversion implies an imminent recession. Therefore, I refer to it as the
“recession” narrative:
Grec : current economic policy → yield curve inversion → recession.
The coverage by CNN’s Cristina Alesci posits the yield curve inversion as a signal of recession,
and therefore establishes a direct causal link from the inverted yield curve to heightened
recession risks. Readers exposed to the recession narrative develop the subjective beliefs
pGrec(x) = p(a)p(s|a)p(y|a, s). They are expected to develop a more pessimistic economic
outlook since they connect yield curve inversions to recessions.
3.4 Empirical analysis
Given the definitions of narratives, I now study the importance of narratives for consumer
sentiment and measure the rate of their contagion. The empirical model takes the form
of a high-frequency event study. Data needed to conduct the empirical analysis draws on
unstructured sources. I describe data construction after specifying the empirical model and
then discuss the results.
3.4.1 Empirical model
The main hypothesis that I test for is whether a narrative of the yield curve inversion
affects consumer sentiment. For consumer i who has read news article d with narrative
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k ∈ {recession, overblown}, the baseline model is:
∆sentimentid = α + β · Narrativekd + εid. (3.5)
The dependent variable is the change in consumer sentiment after exposure to a narrative.
To isolate the effect of the narrative, I focus on the high-frequency changes in consumer
sentiment 24 hours before and after the exposure. The timing is normalized so that the
time when a consumer is exposed to a narrative is t = 0. Therefore, the time dimension of
the baseline model is collapsed. The next few subsections discuss the data sources and data
construction of the inputs into the baseline model, including measures of a narrative, an
article’s loading on a narrative, and the consumer sentiment. The parameter of interest is β
which estimates the effect of a narrative on consumer sentiment. Additionally, the fraction
of consumers with exposure to each narrative provides an estimate of its contagion rate.
Identifying assumptions The empirical model specified in (3.5) contains three underly-
ing identifying assumptions. The first assumption is that the underlying event is exogenous.
This is plausible because even though the Federal Reserve affects treasury yields through its
open market operations, it does not control the exact timing of the yield curve inversion.
The second assumption is that a news subscription is uncorrelated with unobservable
factors affecting the changes in sentiment within the high-frequency window. The assumption
allows for pre-existing differences in sentiment. An obvious unobservable factor that can
potentially influence how consumers respond to the yield curve is political affiliation. I study
news media with center political placement to focus on consumers with similar political views.
Additionally, the high-frequency approach allows for isolating the effect of the exposure to
a narrative.
The third assumption concerns the direction of causality. The measure of exposure to
a narrative that I use is retweeting. The implicit assumption is that retweeting implies the
absorption of new information. However, consumers might selectively retweet articles that
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Table 3.1: Media outlets and coverage on the yield curve inversion
Outlet Pew ideology placement Twitter handle # tweets # articles
MSNBC Liberal/Center msnbc 4 1
CNN Liberal/Center cnn 8 4
NBC News Center nbcnews 4 1
CBS News Center cbsnews 3 3
Bloomberg Center business 143 68
ABC News Center abc 1 1
USA Today Center usatoday 1 1
Yahoo News Center yahoonews 3 3
Wall Street Journal Center wsj 9 6
Fox News Conservative/Center foxbusiness 0 0
Notes: Media outlets with centerist political leaning and their coverage of the yield curve inversion. Data
source for media outlets’ political placement is from (Jurkowitz et al., 2020), which determines the political
ideology of an outlet by surveying the political leaning of its audience. The twitter handle of news outlets
are hand searched. The tweets and articles on the yield curve are collected as described in the main text in
Section 3.4.2.
confirm their existing agenda. I conduct robustness checks which impose a limit on the
number of outlets that can appear in a user’s timeline to remove such users from the sample.
3.4.2 Measuring economic narratives
The first input we need is an empirical measure of narratives. To match the theoretical
definition in Section 3.3, I empirically measure narratives as media outlets’ different in-
terpretations of the yield curve inversion. Bloomberg’s “rainbows and pots of gold,” for
example, interprets the inverted yield curve as one of many factors in determining the eco-
nomic outlook, while CNN’s “fact checking Navarro” interprets a direct causal link from
the current policy to the yield curve inversion to an imminent recession. The third neutral
coverage by Bloomberg’s Brian Chappata can be empirically interpreted as a mix between
the two narratives, giving a balanced representation of both sides of the story.
Data source To measure the narratives created by the news media on the yield curve
inversion, I first collect news coverage of the inversion of the 10Y2Y spread. To separate the
effects of economic narratives from political narratives, I focus on the news outlet rated as
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“center” by the Pew Research Center (Jurkowitz et al., 2020)4 and exclude news aggregators
such as Google News. Even though the event window of the inverted yield curve is from
August 26 to August 30, Google search trends in Figure 3.1b suggest that the interests in
the yield curve rose before the actual inversion and stayed elevated after the un-inversion.
Therefore, I expand the search window for news articles to be from August 19 to September
13, one week before the inversion and two weeks after the un-inversion, respectively.
Table 3.1 contains the list of media outlets included in the sample and their coverage of
the yield curve inversion. As an illustration, Bloomberg tweeted on August 24:
Here’s what the yield curve says about when the next recession could happen
https://t.co/DF4OlRpwIX?amp=1
which contained a link to an in-depth analysis by Lauren Leatherby and Katherine Greifeld
posted on Bloomberg.com on August 15. The number of tweets reported in Table 3.1 is the
number of “base tweets” related to the yield curve5, illustrated by the August 24 Bloomberg
base tweet. The number of articles reported in Table 3.1 is based on the articles linked from
Twitter to the outlets’ websites, such as the one written by Leatherby and Greifeld. Since
outlets typically tweet to direct traffic to their websites, I focus on the linked articles rather
than the tweets to study economic narratives.
Methodology The main tool I use to extract economic narratives from the news articles
is Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) developed by Blei et al. (2003) for natural language
processing.
LDA is a Bayesian factor model6 designed to uncover topics in the articles and represent
each article in terms of these topics. It reduces the dimensionality of the text from the entire
corpus of articles to just K “topics”, or groupings of words that tend to appear together.
4The methodology used in Jurkowitz et al. (2020) to determine the political bias of a media outlets is
through surveying the political ideology of its audience.
5Specifically, the criteria is that a tweet needs to contain both “yield curve” and any of the stems from
“invert”, “invers” or “recession”. The search window is from August 19 to September 13.
6Detailed description of LDA and its application to economics can be found in Hansen et al. (2018).
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LDA is a suitable tool for capturing narratives for two reasons. First, as an unsupervised
learning algorithm, it does not require researchers to assign labels to the observations. The
few inputs required by the algorithm makes it possible to detect economic narratives in
real time. Second, one of the outputs of LDA is θkd ∈ (0, 1), the loading of article d on
narrative k, which allows for the possibility that an article can contain multiple narratives
and provide estimated loadings on each narrative. Therefore, LDA can capture polarizing
articles containing a single narrative as well as balanced ones with multiple narratives.
I estimate the LDA with K = 5 and symmetric Dirichlet priors7. An important feature of
the LDA model is that it is a multi-membership model. For example, the word “recession”
can appear in multiple topics. Most news articles start with introducing the yield curve
inversion as a recession predictor regardless of the narrative. Given the prominent role of
the word, it has a high probability of appearing in multiple topics. K = 5 is the smallest
number of topics that ensures at least one topic does not contain the word recession and
allows for capturing different narratives of the yield curve inversion.
The estimated topics from the LDA are shown in Figure 3.2. Two topics, in particular,
contain the groupings of words that correspond to the theoretical definitions of the yield
curve narratives. The first topic in Panel (3.2a) features the terms such as “recession,”
“yield curve,” “economy” and “Trump,” mapping naturally to the “recession” narrative
Grec. It discuss the economic policy by the Trump administration in conjunction with the
yield curve inversion and recession risks. The second topic in Panel (3.2b) contains a broader
discussion of other factors affecting the economy and investment opportunities in the bond
and stock markets, mapping to the “overblown” narrative Govb.
Unsurprisingly, the word “recession” appears in all but one topics. To match the theoret-
ical definitions of narratives, I focus on the topic in Panel (3.2a) to represent the “recession”
narrative as it has the highest probability of the word appearing. The remaining three
estimated topics are reported in Figure 3.2 for completeness.
7The pre-processing of texts includes removing stop words and numbers, lemmatizing, and representing
the documents with a bigram model.
69
Figure 3.2: Economic narratives of the yield curve inversion: LDA outputs
(a) “Recession” narrative
(b) “Overblown” narrative
(c) Other estimated topics
Notes: Results from estimating the LDA on articles of the yield curve with K = 5 and symmetric Dirichlet
priors. The size of a term represent the likelihood for it to appear in a topic.
The model performs well in capturing the narratives conveyed in news articles. To illus-
trate, for Peter Coy’s article discussed in Section 3.2 which states that the yield curve has
lost its predictive power and that “it’s still rainbows and pots of gold,” the model estimates a
loading of θovb = 0.96 on the overblown narrative and θrec = 0.01 on the recession narrative.
In contrast, for Cristina Alesci’s article that fact-checks Peter Navarro and emphasizes the
recession risks, the model estimates a loading of θrec = 0.84 on the recession narrative and
θovb = 0.05 on the overblown narrative. For the neutral coverage by Brian Chappata which
introduces the yield curve, the model produces more balanced loadings of θrec = 0.67 and
θovb = 0.11.
Based on the LDA outputs, I construct two measures of narratives conveyed in an article.
The first measure is θkd , the loading of article d on narrative k estimated with the LDA, where








d ), which takes the value 1 if the article loading exceeds the cross-
sectional average loading of the narrative and 0 otherwise.
3.4.3 Measuring consumer exposure to narratives
The second input needed to estimate the empirical model is a measure of consumer exposure
to narratives. The microblogging service Twitter provides rich data on the network among
users and on the dissemination of information.
Twitter provides four ways of interacting with posted tweets: quote retweet, retweet, re-
ply and favorite. A “retweet” is when a user forwards a tweet without adding any comments,
while a “quote retweet” requires that a user writes additional text when retweeting. The
additional commentaries added by quote retweeters imply the absorption of new information
contained in the articles linked in the base tweets. Therefore, I use quote retweets as the
main measure of exposure to narratives.
I collect information on the users who have quote retweeted the base tweets using Twit-
ter’s API8, which provides the list of first 100 (quote) retweeters of any tweet. Table 3.2
summarizes the retweeting activities of the base tweets on the yield curve. On average the
base tweets in the sample have 9 quote retweets, and the 95 percentile has 28 quote retweets,
far below the 100 constraint. Therefore, the information collected through Twitter’s API
provides a representative sample of the users who have read the base tweets.
For everyone who has quote retweeted any of the base tweets on the yield curve, I then
collect tweets from their timelines. The goal is to study the changes in user sentiment in
response to the exposure to economic narratives. The event window in the baseline empirical
model is of the high frequency of 24 hours around the time of quote retweet. In addition
to the tweets posted in the narrow windows, I also collect tweets up to one month around
the time of quote retweet to conduct a set of robustness checks. Specifically, to ensure that
retweeting implies the absorption of new information, I exclude users who selectively retweet
8GET statuses/retweets/:id. Details of the API can be found on Twitter’s documentation page.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics on outlets’ base tweets on the yield curve
Mean SD 5th Pctl Median 95th Pctl Obs
Quote retweet count 8.5 39.1 0 3 28.2 178
Retweet count 45.4 89.9 0 23 162.6 178
Reply count 8.8 25.0 0 4 25.3 178
Favorite count 67.4 120.6 0 35 235.8 178
Notes: Descriptive statistics of media outlets’ tweets about the yield curve inversion between August 19
and September 13, 2019. The table reports the descriptive statistics of the numbers of quote retweets,
retweets, replies and favorites of media outlets’ tweets.
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics on retweeting users
Mean SD 5th Pctl Median 95th Pctl Obs
# tweets 3,863 14,948 6 637 15,368 404
# outlets 3.5 2.5 1 3 8 404
Notes: Descriptive statistics of users’ timelines based on tweets one month before and one month after the
quote retweets of the base tweets.
articles to promote their existing agendas by limiting the number of news outlets that can
appear in a user’s timeline. The summary statistics of users’ timelines are reported in Table
3.3.
3.4.4 Measuring consumer sentiment
Based on the tweets from users’ timelines collected as described in the previous subsection, I
estimate consumer sentiment using the näıve Bayes classifier developed by Rish et al. (2001).
Using the Bayes law, the classifier represents the probability of the sentiment y = {0, 1} of
a tweet consisting of terms (t1, · · · , tn) as:




As recognized by Buehlmaier and Whited (2018), näıve Bayes is one of the oldest tools in
natural language processing and has better out-of-sample performance in text-based tasks
than alternative models (Friedman et al., 2001). The special features in tweets require
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additional preprocessing. I convert all user mentions and links into single tokens (@USER and
HTTPURL), remove special characters (RT and FAV), and fix common typos. For example, a
raw tweet:
RT @UMich @UMichFootball: Victors valiant, champion of the west! https://umich.edu/
will be transformed to:
@USER @USER: victors valiant, champion of the west! HTTPURL
After pre-processing, I vectorize tweets using term-frequency inverse-document-frequency
(tf-idf), which weighs a token by its importance to a document relative to the corpus (Ramos





· log D|{d ∈ D : t ∈ d}|︸ ︷︷ ︸
inverse document frequency
(3.6)
where wt,d represent the frequency count of term t in document d, D represents the total
number of documents, and |{d ∈ D : t ∈ d}| is the number of documents term t appears.
Tf-idf reduces the importance of words that appear with high frequency, such as “the” or
“we.”
Then I use the näıve Bayes algorithm to classify the sentiment of tweets. Specifically,
I represent the probability that a tweet j conveys positive sentiment as a function of the
tf-idf-weighted terms t1, · · · , tn of in the tweet:
p̃j(positive) = f(t1, · · · , tn) (3.7)
where tildes indicate that the probability p̃ is predicted by the näıve Bayes classifier.
I pre-train the näıve Bayes classifier using 100, 000 pre-classified tweets in Go et al.
(2009), who use emoticons to automatically classify the sentiment of tweets as positive and
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negative. For example, smiley faces :) indicate positive tweets, and sad faces :( indicate
negative tweets.
Based on the predicted sentiment from the näıve Bayes classifier, I construct two measures













1(p̃j > 0.5) for j posted in day t (3.9)
where sit and dit measure the average sentiment of tweets posted by the consumer in a day.
The difference is that the sentiment measure used in sit is based on the predicted probability
of a tweet having positive sentiment (p̃ ∈ (0, 1)), and that the sentiment measure used in
dit is based on the predicted sentiment, with the value 1 representing a positive tweet and
0 representing a negative tweet. The higher the values of sit and dit, the more optimistic a
consumer is of the outlook.
3.4.5 Results
To gather the results, I combine the empirical elements and estimate the effects of the
recession and overblown narratives:
∆sentimentid = αrec + βrec · Narrativerecd + eid (3.10)
∆sentimentid = αovb + βovb · Narrativeovbd + uid. (3.11)
Narratives are captured using LDA on news articles of the yield curve inversion, as described
in Section 3.4.2. To measure the narrative conveyed in an article, I use both the continuous




whether the loading of an article on the narrative is above the cross-sectional mean. The
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dependent variable is the change in consumer sentiment 24 hours before and after being
exposed to the narrative. Measures of consumer sentiment, sit and dit, are predicted with
the näıve Bayes classifier and described in Section 3.4.4. Whether a consumer is exposed to
a narrative is measured using quote retweeting activities on Twitter, as described in Section
3.4.3.
The parameters of interest are βrec and βovb. They indicate whether a narrative leads
a significant change in the sentiment of consumers who are exposed. The coefficients also
estimate the contagion rates of a narrative within the 24-hour window.
Table 3.4 reports the results from estimating Equations (3.10) and (3.11). Panel 3.4a
indicates that the exposure to the recession narrative leads to a more pessimistic outlook.
Column 1 contains the baseline specification with article narrative measured by 1(θkd > θ̄
k)
and the consumer sentiment measured by ∆sit. A consumer who is exposed to an article
that emphasizes the recession narratives more than the average articles displays 0.01% more
pessimistic sentiment in the 24 hours after absorbing the narrative. The coefficient can be
doubly interpreted as the contagion rate of the narrative, which determines how likely it will
become “viral.” The results of the recession narrative leading to more pessimistic sentiment
is robust to the measures of sentiment or narratives, as reported in Columns (2) – (4).
In contrast, Panel 3.4b suggests that exposure to the overblown narrative leads to no
significant changes in consumer sentiment. This is unsurprising since the overblown narrative
downplays the scenario of a potential recession and conveys that there is no change in the
economic fundamentals.
In Table C.1 in the Appendix, I report the robustness check with limit the maximum
number of news outlet that can appear in a user’s timeline to be 4, the mean number
of outlets in the sample. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, with the
recession narrative causing a more pessimistic sentiment and the overblown narrative having
no effects. Users who selectively retweet to further their agenda are likely fervent supporters
of a narrative. By excluding them, I focus on the susceptible population to better estimate
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Table 3.4: Effects of economic narratives on consumer sentiment
(a) Narrative: “recession”
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)







Constant 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Observations 352 352 352 352
R2 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.007
(b) Narrative: “overblown”
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)






Constant -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Observations 352 352 352 352
R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Notes: Panel (a) reports the baseline results from estimating the specification in Equation (3.10):
∆sentimentid = αrec + βrec · Narrativerecd + eid. Panel (b) reports the baseline results from estimating the
specification in Equation (15) (3.11): ∆sentimentid = αrec + βrec · Narrativeovbd + eid. As described in the
main text in Section 3.4.5, ∆sentimentid is measured as ∆sit or ∆dit and Narrative
rec
d is measured as
1(θkd > θ̄
k) or θkd . Standard errors are in parentheses. * (p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
the contagion rate of a narrative.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence that economic narratives influence consumer senti-
ment. Through illustrating a yield curve inversion event, I define narratives as causal models
which relate policy to outcomes. The empirical strategy that I develop is able to capture the
creation of narratives and trace their influence. The findings suggest that exposure to the
negative narrative of an imminent recession causes consumers to display a more pessimistic
sentiment, while exposure to the positive narrative that recession concerns are overblown
leads to no change in consumer sentiment.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
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A.1 Additional tables and figures in Chapter 1
Table A.1 contains the list of keywords used in frequency search under each topic. The
keywords are based on Econoday, which provides notifications for major economic news and
is the service behind Bloomberg economic calendar.
Table A.1: Macroeconomic topics and keywords
Topic Keywords
General economic conditions
Output GDP, economic growth, macroeconomic condition, construction spend-
ing, national activity, recession
Employment unemployment, JOLTS, labor market, jobless claims, jobs report, non-
farm payroll, ADP employment report, empoyment cost index
Consumption consumer confidence, consumer credit, consumer sentiment, durable
goods, personal income, retail sales
Investment business inventories, manufacturing survey, factory orders, business
outlook survey, manufacturing index, industrial production, business
optimism, wholesale trade
FOMC FOMC, monetary policy, quantitative easing
Housing home sales, home prices, housing starts, housing market
Inflation price index, price level, consumer price index, CPI, PMI, PPI, inflation,
inflationary, disinflation, disinflationary, hyperinflation, hyperinflation-
ary
Oil oil prices, oil supply, oil demand
Notes: Dictionary of keywords used in constructed text-based attention measures. Keywords are based on
names of macroeconomic releases from Econoday, complemented with macroeconomic words and phrases
from popular press.
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Table A.2 contains the summary statistics of firm characteristics by attention. In this
table, a firm is attentive if its prevalence attention to the general topic is nonzero in any
year in the sample period.
Table A.2: Summary statistics of firm characteristics by attention
N Mean Median SD
Inattentive
Total assets (Millions) 33,277 2,873.36 104.02 35,004.36
Age 33,796 7.78 7.00 4.98
Leverage 32,955 0.35 0.17 0.69
Attentive
Total assets (Millions) 102,493 7,311.57 538.12 65,274.94
Age 103,312 11.57 10.00 7.37
Leverage 101,981 0.30 0.20 0.46
Total
Total assets (Millions) 135,770 6,223.78 370.50 59,333.37
Age 137,108 10.64 9.00 7.05
Leverage 134,936 0.31 0.19 0.53
Notes: In this table, a firm is attentive if its prevalence attention to the general topic is nonzero in any
year in the sample period. Firm size is measured by the log of total assets, age is measured as the number
of years since the firm first appeared in our sample, and leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to
market equity.
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A.2 Drivers of firm attention
This appendix investigates firm characteristics that drive firm attention to monetary policy.
We study the cross-sectional and time-series variation in firm i’s attention by estimating at
the annual frequency:
Cross-sectional variation: dit = δt + δj + β · xit + εit (A.1)
Time-series variation: dit = δi + β · xit + εit (A.2)
where xit is one of the firm characteristics discussed in this section. The attention measure
throughout this section is dit, the prevalence measure of attention to FOMC news used in
our baseline specification. Equation (A.1) includes a time fixed effect, δt, and a sector fixed
effect, δj, at 4-digit NAICS level, to study the drivers of firm attention in the cross section.
Equation (A.2) includes a firm fixed effect, δi, to study the drivers of firm attention over a
firm’s life cycle.
A.2.1 Management quality






Sector × Time FE yes no
Firm FE no yes
Notes: Column (1) reports the estimated coefficient β from dit = δt + δj + β ·mit + εit, and Column (2)
reports the estimated coefficient β from dit = δi + β ·mit + εit, described as in the main text. dit is the
prevalence attention to FOMC news, mit is the fraction of board members who have a master degree or
above, δi is a firm fixed effect, δj is a sector fixed effect (4-digit NAICS), and δt is a time fixed effect.
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Management quality is a part of a firm’s infrastructure which determines its information-
processing capacity. We obtain data on publicly-traded firms’ board members and their
education levels from BoardEx. Management quality, mit, is measured as the fraction of firm
i’s board members in year t who have a master degree or above1.
Table A.3 shows that firms with a highly-educated board are more attentive to monetary
policy than their peers. Column (2) shows that a firm is more likely to be attentive when it
has a highly-educated board.
A.2.2 Exposure to monetary policy
Prior exposure to monetary policy is a potential driver of firm attention to FOMC news. To
measure a firm’s exposure to the monetary surprises associated with the FOMC announce-
ment at date τ , we first estimate the sensitivity of its stock prices to prior announcements
over a 5-year rolling window using t ∈ [τ − 5yr, τ):
Baseline model: rit = αiτ + β
baseline
iτ vt + εit
CAPM model: rit − rft = αiτ + βcapmiτ vt + βMiτ (rMt − rft ) + εit
FF3 model: rit − rft = αiτ + βff3iτ vt + β1iτ (rMt − rft ) + β2iτSMBt + β3iτHMLt + εit
where vt is the high-frequency monetary shock, and rit is the close-to-close returns of firm i
at date t. In addition to the baseline model, we also estimate a stock’s sensitivity controlling
for the market factor (rM) and Fama-French 3 factors (rM , SML and HML), to isolate the
sensitivity to monetary policy. We obtain the daily data on factors from Kenneth French’s
website.
Based on the estimated sensitivity, we then measure a firm’s exposure to monetary policy
1Degrees counted as master-level or above include: MBA, MS, MSC, MA, JD, MD, MPA, MSE, PHD,
and degree names which include “master” or “doctor.”
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as the absolute values of the beta’s:
θλiτ = |βλiτ | for λ ∈ {baseline, CAPM, FF3}
Table A.4 shows that firm attention is increasing in the exposure to monetary policy,
both in the cross section and over the time series. The relationship is robust to the measures
of monetary exposure. In Appendix A.3, we incorporate additional controls for monetary
exposure in the baseline specification to show that even though exposure drives a firm’s
attention, the baseline results of differential monetary transmission by attention is not driven
by firms’ exposure to monetary policy.
A.2.3 Firm characteristics
Table A.5 reports the relationship between attention and firm characteristics documented in
existing literature to be important for monetary transmission (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994;
Cloyne et al., 2018; Ottonello and Winberry, 2020).
We obtain data on firm balance-sheet items from Compustat. In this section, we follow
the data construction procedures in Ottonello and Winberry (2020) to make our results
comparable to existing literature. We define size as the log of total assets, age as the years
since first occurrence in the Compustat sample, and leverage as the debt-to-asset ratio.
All firm covariates are standardized, and leverage is in addition demeaned to capture the
permanent differences across firms. Sample excludes the financial and utility sectors.
Panel A in Table A.5 shows the in the cross section in a given year, firm attention to
FOMC news increases with size and decreases with age and leverage. Panel B in Table A.5
shows as a firm grows older and bigger, it is more likely to become attentive to monetary
news. The lack of significance of the leverage measure over a firm’s life cycle is unsurprising,
because the demeaned measure leverage captures the permanent differences across firms.
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Table A.4: Attention and exposure to monetary policy
Panel A: Time-sector level
(1) (2) (3)
Exposure (baseline model) 0.0016∗∗∗
(0.0006)
Exposure (CAPM model) 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0006)
Exposure (FF3 model) 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Observations 74272 73649 72509
R2 0.034 0.035 0.035
Time × Sector FE yes yes yes
Firm FE no no no
Firm controls yes yes yes




Exposure (CAPM model) 0.0012∗∗
(0.0006)
Exposure (FF3 model) 0.0019∗∗∗
(0.0006)
Observations 74280 73657 72520
R2 0.567 0.567 0.560
Time × Sector FE no no no
Firm FE yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes
Notes: Panel A reports the estimated coefficient β from dit = δt + δj + β · θλit + εit, and Panel B reports the
estimated coefficient β from dit = δi + β · θλit + εit, with θλit denoting the exposure to monetary policy with
λ ∈ {baseline, CAPM, FF3} and constructed as described in the main text. dit is the prevalence attention
to FOMC news, δi is a firm fixed effect, δj is a sector fixed effect (4-digit NAICS), and δt is a time fixed
effect. Firm controls include age, size and leverage.
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Table A.5: Attention and firm covariates








Observations 104786 104599 104395
R2 0.031 0.033 0.030
Time × Sector FE yes yes yes
Firm FE no no no








Observations 104797 104609 104406
R2 0.574 0.579 0.576
Time × Sector FE no no no
Firm FE yes yes yes
Notes: Panel A reports the estimated coefficient β from dit = δt + δj + β · xit + εit, and Panel B reports the
estimated coefficient β from dit = δi + β · xit + εit, where xit is the firm size, age or leverage, constructed as
described in the main text, dit is the prevalence attention to FOMC news, δi is a firm fixed effect, δj is a




This appendix provides additional robustness checks of our baseline results reported in Table
(1.2) from estimating the specification specification in (1.4).
Results robust to controlling for management quality Table A.6 shows that our
baseline results are robust to controlling for management quality. We measure management
quality as the fraction of board members with education level of the master degree or above,
as described in Appendix A.2.1. Since good management can capitalize on expansionary
shocks and mitigate contrationary shocks, we allow the controls for management to interact
with the monetary shocks asymmetrically. The specification estimated in Table A.6 is:
rit = δj + δjvt + βv+vt1vt>0 + βv−vt1vt<0 + βddit + βmmit
+ βdv+ditvt1vt>0 + βdv−ditvt1vt<0 + βmv+mitvt1vt>0 + βmv−mitvt1vt<0
+ β′X(Xt +Xtvt) + εit,
(A.3)
where mit denotes management quality and dit denotes our baseline prevalence attention
measure. Column (1) of Table A.6 reports the results from our baseline specification using
only the sample that overlaps with BoardEx data. Column (2) reports no significant effects
of managment quality on responses to monetary policy. Column (3) reports the effects of
attention controlling for management quality. The Wald test for the null hypothesis that
βdv+ and βdv− are equal is rejected at 1%, suggesting that the finding of asymmetric responses
to monetary policy by attention is robust to controlling for management quality.
Results robust to controlling for monetary exposure The theoretical prediction of
asymmetry from Section 1.3 confirms the baseline effects to be driven by firm attention rather
than firm exposure to monetary policy. Nevertheless, we conduct additional robustness in
Table A.7 to control for firms’ exposure to monetary policy, constructed as described in
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Appendix A.2.2 as rolling historical return sensitivity to monetary shocks. For all three
measures of monetary exposure, θλit for λ ∈ {baseline, CAPM, FF3}, the Wald tests for the
null hypothesis that βdv+ = βdv− are rejected at 5%, showing that our results are not driven
by firms’ exposure to monetary policy.
Results not driven by the information effect of monetary policy Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018a) documents that FOMC announcementa release information about the
economic fundamentals, in addition to monetary policy. Following Miranda-Agrippino and
Ricco (2021), we control for the information effects of monetary policy by including as
controls the Greenbook forecast revisions between FOMC meetings. We obtain data on
Greenbook forecasts from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Table A.8 show that
our main results are robust to controlling for Greenbook forecast revisions.
Results robust to controlling for macro fluctuations While the high-frequency mon-
etary shocks vt are considered exogenous, we conduct additional robustness controlling for
business-cycle fluctuations. Macro controls include: lagged real GDP growth, unemployment
rate, and inflation, obtained from FRED. Column (1) of Table A.9 displays our baseline re-
sults without macro controls. Column (2) includes macro controls, controlling for aggregate
fluctuations. Column (3) includes macro controls and their interactions with the monetary
shock, controlling for differential firm sensitivity to aggregate fluctuations. Column (4) in-
cludes macro controls and their separate interactions with expansionary and contractionary
monetary shocks, controlling for asymmetric firm sensitivity to aggregate fluctuations. Our
main results are robust under all specifications.
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Shock × Attn ×1vt>0 2.48∗∗∗ 2.59∗∗∗
(0.86) (0.91)




Shock × Mgmt ×1vt>0 1.24 1.53∗∗
(0.76) (0.73)
Shock × Mgmt ×1vt<0 -0.68 -2.54
(2.88) (2.58)
Observations 324154 324154 324154
R2 0.038 0.038 0.038
Clustered SE yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes
4-digit NAICS FE yes yes yes
Wald Test p-value 0.008 0.528 0.003
Notes: Results from estimating the specification in (A.3), with variables as defined in the main text:
rit = δj + δjvt + βv+vt1vt>0 + βv−vt1vt<0 + βddit + βmmit
+ βdv+ditvt1vt>0 + βdv−ditvt1vt<0 + βmv+mitvt1vt>0 + βmv−mitvt1vt<0
+ β′X(Xt +Xtvt) + εit,
Column (1) shows our baseline results, using only sample that overlaps with BoardEx data. Column (2)
shows the effects of management quality. Column(3) the effects of attention controlling for management
quality. Standard firm controls include age, size and leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the shock
level and reported in parentheses. * (p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
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Table A.7: Controlling for exposure to monetary policy
(1) (2) (3)
Shock × Attn ×1vt>0 2.03∗∗∗ 2.03∗∗∗ 2.03∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.72) (0.72)
Shock × Attn ×1vt<0 -5.99∗ -5.99∗ -5.94∗
(3.25) (3.25) (3.24)
Observations 572884 571708 568169
R2 0.026 0.026 0.026
Clustered SE yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes
4-digit NAICS FE yes yes yes
Monetary sensitivity control baseline model CAPM model FF3 model
Wald Test p-value 0.027 0.027 0.027
Notes: Results from estimating the baseline specification (1.4) with additional controls for monetary
exposure, θλit, λ ∈ {baseline, CAPM, FF3}, defined in Appendix A.2.2. Standard firm controls include age,
size and leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the shock level and reported in parentheses. *
(p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
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Table A.8: Controlling for Greenbook forecast revisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock × Attn ×1vt>0 2.02∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗
(0.72) (0.75) (0.72) (0.72)
Shock × Attn ×1vt<0 -5.87∗ -5.47 -5.71 -5.71
(3.18) (3.58) (3.68) (3.68)
Observations 575667 575667 575667 575667
R2 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes
4-digit NAICS FE yes yes yes yes
Greenbook rev controls rgdp rgdp rgdp
infl infl
unemp
Wald Test p-value 0.026 0.070 0.063 0.063
Notes: Results from estimating the baseline specification (1.4) with additional controls for Greenbook
forecast revisions. Column (1) displays the baseline results from Table 1.2. Columns (2) - (4) adds
Greenbook forecast revisions for real GDP, inflation, and unemployment iteratively. Standard firm controls
include age, size and leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the shock level and reported in parentheses.
* (p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
90
Table A.9: Controlling for macroeconomic variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock × Attn ×1vt>0 2.02∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗ 1.74∗∗
(0.72) (0.73) (0.78) (0.71)
Shock × Attn ×1vt<0 -5.87∗ -6.27∗ -5.38 -7.31∗∗
(3.18) (3.21) (3.34) (3.31)
Observations 575667 575667 575667 575667
R2 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.028
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes
4-digit NAICS FE yes yes yes yes
Macro controls no yes yes yes
+ interactions no no yes no
+ asym interactions no no no yes
Wald Test p-value 0.026 0.021 0.060 0.014
Notes: Results from estimating the baseline specification (1.4) with an additional vector of macro control
Zt−1, where Zt−1 include lagged real GDP growth, unemployment rate, and inflation. Column (1) displays
the baseline results from Table 1.2. Column (2) includes macro controls Zt−1,. Column (3) includes Zt−1
and Zt−1vt. Column (4) includes Zt−1 and Zt−1vt1v>0, and Zt−1vt1v<0. Standard firm controls include
age, size and leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the shock level and reported in parentheses. *
(p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
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A.4 Additional results from textual analysis
This appendix contains a set of additional results using natural language processing to in-
vestigate the context in which firms discuss macro keywords in 10-K filings and to provide
further validation of the text-based measures.
A.4.1 Itemized frequency search
10-K filings have standard formats and are organized in sections. We perform refined fre-
quency counts for each of the section, or “items”, to see where attention is concentrated in.
Results of frequency counts of macroeconomic keywords by filing item are shown in Figure
A.1 in the Appendix. Discussions of the macroeconomy are concentrated in Description
of Business (Item 1), Risk Factors (Item 1A) and Management Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations (Item 7A).
Figure A.1: Firm attention by filing items
Notes: Heat map of firm attention by filing items. Each row represents a section (“item”) of 10-K, and each
column represents a macroeconomic topic. Darkness represents a higher fraction of firms that pay attention
to a macroeconomic topic in an item.
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Results in Figure A.1 show that firms pay attention to macro news to assess the impact
on their business operations and risks, consistent with assumptions that firms mentioning a
macroeconomic topic do so in order to incorporate the news into their decision making.
A.4.2 LDA: context of macro discussions
To enable automated context detection, we use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model
to uncover topics firms tend to discuss in conjunction with macro news. LDA (Blei et al.,
2003) is an unsupervised learning algorithm aimed at grouping words in documents into
meaningful topics. We apply LDA to texts in earning filings within 20 words surrounding a
macroeconomic keyword and set the number of topics to be 10.
Following Hansen et al. (2018), we pre-process texts of 10-K filings for LDA as follows:
we remove numbers and words that are only one character. Then we lemmatize to combine
different word forms (for example, “operated” and “operates” are lemmatized to “operate”).
The advantage of lemmatizing over stemming is that the resulting LDA outputs are more
friendly to interpret. Our corpus include words and bigrams which appear for at least 20
times. We filter out words that occur in less than 20 documents or more than 50% of the
documents. Then we transform the texts through bag-of-words representation.
We model topics surrounding each of the nine macro categories for the attention measure,
as well as an aggregate category containing keywords from all categories. Figures A.2 and
A.3 visualize the LDA output surrounding keywords in all categories.Figure A.2 shows the
heat map of LDA outputs. Each row represent a topic clustered by LDA, and the darkness
of the cell within a topic represent the likelihood of a word to appear in the topic. Figure
A.3 highlights the word cloud of selected topics in A.2.
Although LDA output does not label topics, it is natural to characterize some of the
topics. Topic 1 relates to business operations, as firms discuss how macro conditions feed
into into their daily operations; Topic 2 relates to demand, as firms track and gauge the
aggregate demand; Topic 6 relate to financing costs, as firms pay attention to how monetary
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policy affect their financial costs, investment decisions, and portfolio holdings; Topic 10
relates to labor costs, as firms assess the tightness of the labor market. Rest of the topics
relate to housing, currency, and risk factors.
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Figure A.2: LDA output for texts surrounding all macro keywords
Figure A.3: LDA output for texts surrounding all macro keywords: Selected topics
95
A.4.3 Lexical similarity
Our measure of lexical similarity is a Jaccard score, J(yit, yit−1), which measures the share
of unique non-stop words that appear between the current year’s 10-K (yi) compared to the




The Jaccard score is bounded by the unit interval, and is decreasing with the ”uniqueness”
of the text. Figure A.4 reports the average Jaccard score for each section of 10-K filings.
Figure A.4: Lexical similarity by section of 10-K filings
Notes: Average Jaccard scores for sections in 10-K filings. The Jaccard score is bounded by the unit interval.
A high Jaccard score represents high lexical similarity between filings. The Management’s Discussion section
has the lowest level of lexical similarity in all 10-K sections.
We then restrict the attention measures to keywords mentioned in low Jaccard score
sections: Business (Item 1) and Managment’s Discussion (Item 7). We exclude Legal Pro-
ceedings (Item 3) that has a low Jaccard score to avoid false positives from legal languages.
Regression results with attention restricted to low lexical similarity 10-K sections are re-
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Table A.10: Restricting attention to low lexical similarity 10-K sections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock 4.13 4.13
(2.53) (2.53)
Attention -0.03 -0.08∗ -0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Shock × Attn 0.02
(0.47)
Shock ×1vt>0 4.55∗ 6.21∗∗
(2.62) (2.53)
Shock ×1vt<0 -4.16 -1.45
(4.29) (4.36)
Shock × Attn ×1vt>0 0.79 0.50
(0.50) (0.47)
Shock × Attn ×1vt<0 -5.24∗∗ -4.95∗∗
(2.10) (2.09)
Observations 546596 546596 546596 409889
R2 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.027
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes
Firm controls yes yes yes yes
4-digit NAICS FE yes yes yes yes
excl. ZLB no no no yes
Wald Test p-value 0.010 0.020
Notes: Results from variants of estimating the baseline specification in (1.4), restricting to 10-K items that
discuss firm operations (Items 1 and 7). Standard errors are in parentheses. * (p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05),
*** (p < 0.01).
ported in Table A.10.
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A.5 Additional details for the stylized model
A.5.1 Approximation of firm profits in the stylized model
Under second-order approximation around the non-stochastic steady state, the log approxi-
mation of a firm’s profits, denoted by π̂(st, at), is given by:
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In the second line, πa(s̄, ā) = 0 because of optimal choice. In addition, the assumption that
a = s under full information yields πa(a, a) = 0 ∀a, which implies πsa(s̄, ā) = −πaa(s̄, ā).
The third line added and subtracted 1
2
πaa(s̄, ā)ā
2ŝ2t to complete squares and used the fact
that ā = s̄ in the steady state. The resulting expression is equation (1.1).
A.5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We consider the responses of returns to an aggregate shock ε. Holding all else equal,
that is, πkss(s, a) = πss(s, a) and π
k
aa(s, a) = πaa(s, a) for all firms k, we can show the following
for heterogeneity in exposure and in attention.
1. Exposure: Let firms be heterogeneous in exposure and homogeneous in attention.
Specifically, suppose firm i is more exposed to macro conditions than firm j, that is,
πis > π
j
s > 0. We consider how heterogeneity in exposure affects return elasticity for
cases in which both firms are attentive and both are inattentive.
(a) Case 1 (both firms attentive): When firms are both attentive, ât = ŝt. Then by








= πks (s̄, ā)s̄+
(
πss(s̄, ā)s̄
2 − πaa(s̄, ā)ā2
)
ε for firm k = i, j.
Therefore, the return elasticity for firms i is larger for the return elasticity for





= πis(s̄, ā)s̄− πjs(s̄, ā)s̄ > 0
because πis > π
j
s > 0.
(b) Case 2 (both firms inattentive): When both firms are inattentive, the return
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2(fk(ε)− ε)(f ′k(ε)− 1) for firm k = i, j.
Since firms are only heterogeneous in exposure, the second and third term in the





= πis(s̄, ā)s̄− πjs(s̄, ā)s̄ > 0
which is also independent of the magnitude of ε.
2. Attention: Now instead let firms be heterogeneous in attention and homogeneous in
exposure, so the attentive firm i has f ′i(ε) = 1, the inattentive firm j has f
′
j(ε) < 1,
and both firms have πis = π
j
s. The return elasticity for attentive and inattentive firms
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ε+ πaa(s̄, ā)ā
2(fj(ε)− ε)(f ′j(ε)− 1)
(A.5)
since firms are homogenous in exposure: πis = π
j
s = πs. The relative magnitude of
return elasticities between attentive and inattentive firms depends on the sign of the
shock ε. Specifically, we consider three cases.
(a) Zero shock (ε = 0): Since f(0) = 0, (A.4) and (A.5) lead to:
∂ri
∂ε
= πs(s̄, ā)s̄ =
∂rj
∂ε








(fj(ε)− ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(f ′j(ε)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0








(fj(ε)− ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0




A.6 Additional details for the quantitative model
A.6.1 Approximation of firms’ value function
A firms’ value function for its operating profits can be expressed as
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where Π(Pit, Pt, Qt) denotes the firm’s operating profits, and L(Pit, Pt, Qt) ≡ Π(Pit,Pt,Qt)Π∗(P ∗it,Pt,Qt)
denotes the loss from imperfect information relative to full-information profits Π∗(P ∗it, Pt, Qt).
The last equality follows the fact that L is homogeneous of degree 1.
Under the second-order log approximation around the non-stochastic steady state, we
can express the loss as:
Π(Pit, Pt, Qt)
Π∗(P ∗it, Pt, Qt)
≈ Π(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
Π(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
+ (pit − p∗it)P̄
Π1(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
Π(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
+ (p2it − p∗2it )
P̄
2
Π11(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
Π(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
− pitp∗itP̄ 2
Π1(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
2
Π(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)2
+ (pit − p∗it)ptP̄ 2
Π12(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
Π(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
+ (pit − p∗it)qtP̄ Q̄
Π13(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
Π(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
= 1 + (p2it − p∗2it )
P̄
2
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= 1 + (pit − p∗it)2
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2
Π11(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
Π(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)
where lowercase letters denote log deviations from the steady state. The second equality
uses the fact that Π1 = 0 from optimal choices. In addition, Π1(P
∗
it, Pt, Qt) = 0 implies
p∗itP̄Π11(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)+ptP̄Π12(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄)+qitQ̄Π13(P̄ , P̄ , Q̄) = 0, which leads to the third equality.
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A firm’s log operating value, vop, can be decomposed into:
vop = v∗ + l
consisting of v∗, the full-information value, and l, the loss in firm value from imperfect
information approximated as above.
A.6.2 Details for model calibration
Figure A.5: Sensitivity of simulated moments to ωL



























Notes: Calibration plots showing simulated moments for a range of costs of information parameters (ωL).
We simulate models for a panel of 100 firms and for 1000 periods with 100 periods burn-ins. Simulated
moments are generated with regressions discussed in the text in Section 1.5:
rit = c+ β11v>0 + βv+vt1v>0 + βv−vt1v<0 + βddit + βdv+ditνit1v>0 + βdv−ditνit1v<0 + εit
The left panel shows the sensitivity of simulated βv+ to the calibration of ωL; the middle panel shows the
sensitivity of βv−; the right panel shows the sensitivity of
1
2 |βv+| + 12 |βv|, which we use to calibrate ωL to
match the empirical moment in the data.
A.6.3 Passthrough regressions
The passthrough of nominal interest rate change to nominal demand change is estimated
with local projections (Jordà, 2005). We estimate the following model for horizons h =
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1, 2, · · · , 20:
∆hyt−1,t+h = αh + βhε
i
t + uth
where y is the variable of interest, and εit is a shock to the nominal interest rate. Path of
βh informs the cumulative changes in the dependent variable in response to the interest rate
shock.
The dependent variables are U.S. manufacturing output over the sample period of 1994
to 2019. We estimate the responses of manufacturing prices, real output and nominal out-
put. We time aggregate high-frequency monetary policy shocks to quarterly to match the
frequency of dependent variables. Figure A.6 shows the results of the local projection. A
one percentage point expansionary shock to the interest rate leads to about 1.6 percent peak
increase in nominal demand.
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Appendix for Chapter 2
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B.1 Additional tables and figures in Chapter 2
Table B.1: Daily returns of equity indices
Release Nonrelease All Days
SP500 Ex-Financial
Mean -0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Std Deviation 1.32 1.12 1.14
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 486 5,048 5,534
SML
Mean 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
Std Deviation 1.58 1.39 1.41
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 486 4,603 5,089
Russell
Mean 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
Std Deviation 1.70 1.46 1.48
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 486 4,603 5,089
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of daily returns of equity indices (S&P 500 ex-financials, S&P
Small Cap 600 and Russell 2000). Returns are computed as daily log differences. Mean and standard devia-
tions are reported in percent. “Release Days” refer to days with earnings releases by financial intermediaries
in the sample; “Nonrelease Days” refer to days without earnings releases; “All Days” include both release
days and nonrelease days. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table B.2: Daily changes in bond option-adjust spreads
Release Non-Release All Days N Bonds
AAA
Mean -0.07 0.03 0.02 293
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Std Deviation 5.96 10.38 10.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
CCC
Mean 1.20 1.80 1.74 3308
(0.29) (0.10) (0.09)
Std Deviation 110.09 106.81 107.17
(0.20) (0.07) (0.06)
All bonds
Mean 1.07 1.60 1.55 3601
(0.26) (0.09) (0.08)
Std Deviation 104.11 100.86 101.21
(0.18) (0.06) (0.06)
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of daily changes in option-adjusted spreads for nonfinancial
constituent bonds in ICE BofA’s AAA and CCC & Lower indices of U.S. corporate bonds. Mean and
standard deviation of daily changes in option-adjusted spreads are reported in basis points. The number
of nonfinancial constituent bonds (CUSIP) in each index are reported. “Release Days” refer to days with
earning releases by financial intermediaries in the sample; “Nonrelease Days” refer to days without earnings
releases; “All Days” include both release days and nonrelease days. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table B.3: Bond holdings by intermediary
Financial Intermediary Mean Std Dev Min Max
J.P. Morgan Chase 9,782 31,692 0 351,996
Goldman Sachs 3,963 14,337 0 254,385
Ameriprise Financial 2,486 8,389 0 113,540
Northern Trust 910 4,674 0 88,840
Wells Fargo 734 2,875 0 38,253
Citicorp 624 3,029 0 66,300
Bank of New York Mellon 588 2,647 0 48,695
Morgan Stanley 244 1,234 0 28,555
Merrill Lynch 17 276 0 8,901
U.S. Bancorp 7 55 0 2,000
Bank of America 2 45 0 1,580
All 1,760 11,337 0 351,996
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics on bond holdings by financial intermediaries. The set of bonds
includes bonds rated CCC or lower in ICE issued by firms with at least 10 bonds outstanding.
Table B.4: Summary statistics for event and nonevent days
Financial Intermediaries Nonfinancial Firms
Event Nonevent Event Nonevent
Mean of Weighted ∆P -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.01
(0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Std Dev of Weighted ∆P 2.98 2.34 1.31 1.20
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Covariance with SP500 2.76 2.07 1.45 1.29
Covariance with CCC -0.17 -0.10 -0.05 -0.06
Observations 492 3,012 877 2,347
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for identification through heteroskedasticity: weighted daily
stock-price changes for event days and nonevent days. Nonevent days are defined as days without earning
releases and are at least 2 days away from event days. S&P500 excludes financial firms. Standard errors are
in parentheses.
107
Figure B.1: Construction of financial shocks
(a) Median Positive Shock (Inside Trading Hours)
(b) Median Negative Shock (Inside Trading Hours)
(c) Median Positive Shock (Outside Trading Hours)
(d) Median Negative Shock (Outside Trading Hours)
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Figure B.2: The effect of financial shocks on financial sector’s net worth
Notes: The figures show the cumulative responses of financial intermediaries’ market capitalization to in-
dividual unweighted financial shocks. The left panel shows the market capitalization responses from all
financial intermediaries in our sample in response to a financial shock. The middle panel shows the market
capitalization response from the intermediary that reports the earning underlying the financial shock. The
right panel shows the market capitalization response from all remaining nonreporting intermediaries.
Figure B.3: Placebo tests: financial shocks and nonevent days
Notes: The figures show placebo tests with nonevent days. Specifications take the form: ∆ log yt+j =
c+ βνt + εt. Changes in the dependent equity indices are constructed using alternative dates j = −3, · · · , 3
around the event date, with j = 0 corresponding to the event date of earnings releases.
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Table B.5: Placebo tests: effect of shocks to nonfinancial firms
SP500 SmallCap Russell Obs
Baseline 0.334 0.064 0.135 877
(0.220) (0.256) (0.268)
Narrow window only −0.205 −0.557* −0.513 546
(0.272) (0.330) (0.346)
Macro controls 0.338 0.067 0.137 877
(0.219) (0.256) (0.268)
Notes: This table shows placebo tests with HF shocks generated with nonfinancial firms in Dow Jones. Shock
construction and regression specifications follow those for financial shocks. Firms include 3M, Alco, Philip
Morris, Apple, AT&T, Bethlehem Steel, Boeing, Caterpillar, Chevron, Cisco, Coca-Cola, Dow, Dupont,
Eastman Kodak, Exxon, FW Woolworth, General Electric, General Motors, Goodyear, Hewlett-Packard,
Home Depot, Intel, IBM, International Paper, Johnson & Johnson, Kraft, McDonald’s, Merck, Microsoft,
Nike, Pfizer, Procter & Gamble, Sears, Texaco, Union Carbide, United Technologies, UnitedHealth, Verizon,
Visa, Walgreens, Walmart, Walt Disney, and Westinghouse.
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B.2 Additional exercises of HF financial shocks
B.2.1 Financial shocks and surprise earnings
In this section, we document the connection between HF shocks and the surprise compo-
nent of intermediaries’ earnings. Figure B.4 reports the binned scatter plot between the
unweighted HF shocks and earnings surprises of the reporting intermediaries. Following
the post-earnings-announcement-drift literature (Chordia and Shivakumar, 2006), earnings
surprises are measured using the standardized unexpected earnings, defined as the differ-
ence between the reported earnings per share and the consensus forecast, normalized by
the standard error of analysts’ forecast errors. We observe a positive relationship between
HF shocks and earnings surprises, suggesting the HF movements of an intermediary’s stock
prices around the earnings announcement are associated with its earnings outcome.






















−5 0 5 10
Earning Shock
Notes: This figure shows a binned scatter plot between financial shocks and earnings surprises with 50
bins. Financial shocks are unweighted and constructed as described in the main text. Earnings surprises are
measured as standardized unexpected earnings, defined as surprises in earnings per share normalized by the
standard errors of analysts’ forecast errors.
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B.2.2 Predictability of financial shocks
In this section, we use a state-of-art machine-learning model to provide evidence suggesting
that the HF financial shocks are not predictable using macroeconomic and financial variables
available prior to the shock. We use two sets of predictors. The first macro panel includes a
large panel of 126 monthly macroeconomic series constructed by McCracken and Ng (2016)
and available through FRED-MD. The second financial panel is of higher daily frequency
and includes stock prices of the financial intermediaries in our sample, as well as SP500 and
VIX.
Our main forecasting model is random forests (Breiman, 2001), which produce an av-
eraged prediction from a large collection of regression trees. Random forests incorporate
nonlinearity and multi-way interactions between predictors, which makes it useful for macroe-








which averages the forecasts of B regression trees T (x; Θb), where x is the set of predictors
and Θb characterizes the parameters in the bth tree.
1
As Gentzkow et al. (2019) argues, the benefits of regression trees from nonlinearity and
high-order interactions lessens with high-dimensional predictors, so we first perform variable
selection with elastic net (Zou and Hastie, 2005), an implementation of soft thresholding
regularization that drops uninformative predictors using penalized regressions. The elastic
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,
1Please see Hastie et al. (2009) for a comprehensive exposition of trees and random forests.
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Table B.6: Out-of-sample R2 of predictions of financial shocks
Macro Financial
Random Forest −9.7% −16.2%
Random Walk 24.2%
Notes: This table reports the out-of-sample R2 of random-forest forecasts based on a large panel of macroe-
conomic and financial variables compared against out-of-sample R2 of random-walk forecasts based on stock
returns one day before the shock. The out-of-sample R2 is defined as R2oos = 1 − Σt(yt−ŷm,t)
2
Σt(yt−ȳt)2 where ȳt is
the rolling-mean forecast computed on a window matching the model-estimation window, and ŷm,t is the
forecast from the model. Negative numbers indicate the forecast underperforms the rolling historical mean
of the series.
which minimizes the sum or regression residuals and a penalty term, a weighted average of
LASSO and ridge. Following Borup and Schütte (2020), we set α = 0.5 for an equal weight
between LASSO and ridge regressions and tune the penalty parameter λ so that the elastic
net selects the 20 best predictors.
We then use random forests to form predictions using 48-month rolling windows for macro
predictors and 48-day rolling windows for financial predictors. To assess forecastability, we
compare the predictions from random forests against those from a random walk, formed
with the stock returns one day before the financial shock, converted to match the size of the
60-minute shock window. The metric for evaluating forecastability is the out-of-sample R2





where ȳt is the rolling-mean forecast computed on a window matching the model-estimation
window, and ŷm,t is the forecast from the model. R
2
oos lies in the range (−∞, 1] with negative
numbers indicating the model underperforms the historical mean of the series.
Assessments of forecastability of the financial shocks by macroeconomic and financial
predictors are shown in Table B.6. Random-forest forecasts with both the macro and financial
predictors have negative R2oos, suggesting worse performance than historical rolling-mean
forecasts. The results also suggest incorporating panels of macro and financial variables
113
does not help forecast the HF financial shocks compared to a random walk.
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Appendix for Chapter 3
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C.1 Additional tables and figures in Chapter 3
Figure C.1: Yield curve inversion and recessions in the US
















Notes: Yield curve and recessions in the US for 1976–2019. The blue solid line displays the spread between
10-year treasury yield and 2-year treasury yield (“10Y2Y”). Recession dates as classified by NBER are shaded
in grey.
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Table C.1: Limiting the number of outlets in user timelines
(a) Narrative: “recession”
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)







Constant 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Observations 227 227 227 227
R2 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.012
(b) Narrative: “overblown”
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)






Constant -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Observations 227 227 227 227
R2 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
Notes: Results from estimating the specification in (3.10) and (3.11) while limited the number of different
news outlets appearing in a user’s timeline over a two-month period to be 4. Details are as described in the
main text in Section 3.4.5. Standard errors are in parentheses. * (p < 0.10), ** (p < 0.05), *** (p < 0.01).
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C.2 Additional details for narratives
The main text describes two narratives:
G1 : a→ s← θ → y
G2 : a→ s→ y
This appendix makes further functional-form assumptions to illustrate how G1, G2, and their
implied policies can both be stable in the steady state. Suppose the long-run probability
of the current policy p(a = 1) = α, and of the fundamentals is p(θ = 1) = δ ∈ (ε, 1 − ε)
for ε small, which is independent of a. The output is a direct results of the fundamentals,
p(y = θ|θ) = 1, ∀θ, and the yield curve is influeced by both the economic policy and the
fundamentals, p(s = 1|a, θ) = a + (1 − a)θ. Assume that the policy which place weight d
on the action a = 1 gives the payoff u(d, y) = y − 1
2
(d − ε)2. The payoff implies that an
expansion y = 1 is the ideal outcome, and that the optimal policy is d = ε, deviating as
infrequenly from the current policy as possible. The environment follows Eliaz and Spiegler
(2020).
First, consider a steady-state with only the narrative G1, which correctly predicts y = 1
with probability δ independent of the action. The expected payoff from the narrative is given
by:
U(G1, d;α) = δ − 1
2
(d− ε)2
which induces the ideal policy d = ε and an expected utility of δ.
Now consider the entry of a new narrative G2, which creates an artificial causal structure












= (1 · d · δ
δ + α(1− δ) + δ · (1− d) ·
δ




= δ · δ + d(1− δ)




≈ δ + (1− δ)d− 1
2
d2
where the last line uses the fact that α = ε ≈ 0 under the steady-state with a single narrative
G1. The optimal policy under the subjective belief d = 1− δ leads to an expected utility of
δ + 1
2
(1− δ)2 > δ, which is greater than the steady-state utility under the single narrative.
The economy reaches a new steady state when the long-run probability of the current
policy is α∗ so that U(G2, d2;α∗) = δ with d2 = argmaxd U(G
2, d;α∗). In the new steady
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